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A compact by which a whole nation is called upon to suspend its 
memories of torture, murder, forcible ''disappearances'' of loved ones, 
a compact which would have citizens pretend that the tragic losses and 
suffering which they have undergone never occurred, this ... is no 
bargain. This is not amnesty; it is forcible amnesia. The ''peace'' 
that is bought at this price is supported by a thread slenderer even 
than the thread by which the sword of Damocles was suspended. 
Ambassador Oliver H. Jaclanan, Chairman 
Inter-Atuerican Commission on Human R.ights1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[Vol. 31:1 
On September 15, 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton told a national radio and television 
audience that the military leaders in Haiti are ''plainly the most brutal, the most violent 
regime anywhere in our hemisphere." 2 He later added that "their reign of terror-a 
campaign of murder, rape, and mutilation-gets worse with every passing day" 3 and said 
that ''the brutal atrocities ... threaten tens of thousands of Haitians.' ' 4 Just three days 
after describing what were seemingly crimes against humanity, President Clinton again 
addressed the American people about the situation in Haiti-this time to explain why an 
accord providing the Haitian military leaders amnesty from prosecution for their crimes was 
"a good agreement for the United States and for Haiti." 5 A contrary view was offered by 
Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, who said the Haitian amnesty accord is "an example of the wrong way 
to deal with these [atrocities]. It doesn't serve justice and it ignores the victims. " 6 
In light of the growing number of countries like Haiti that are presently wrestling with 
their repressive pasts/ the question of the permissibility of granting amnesty8 from 
I. Ambassador Oliver H. Jackman, speech before the First Committee of the XIX Regular meeting of the 
General Assembly to Present the Annual Report of the IACHR (Nov. 1989), in Dianne F. Orentlicher, Settling 
Accounts: 17ze Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2579 (1991). 
2. Gene Gibbons, Clinton Vows Haiti's Military Will Leave, Reuters, Sept. !4, !994, available on LE)OS, 
News Library, ALLNWS File. 
3. President Bill Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation (Sepl I 7, 1994), in 17ze Crisis in Haiti, U.S. 
Department of State, Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter 17ze Crisis 
in Haiti]. 
4. Letter from President Clinton to the Spealcer of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate (Sept. 18, 1994), in The Crisis in Haiti, supra note 3 [hereinafter Letter from President Clinton]. 
5. President Bill Clinton, Oval Office Address to the Nation (Sept. I 5, 1994), in The Crisis in Haiti, supra 
note 3. 
6. See Peter S. Canellos, Amnesty Plan Worries UN War-Crimes Prosecutor, BOSTON GLOBE, Ocl I, 1994, 
at 8. Goldstone joined a chorus of international rights groups in criticizing the amnesty accord. See, e.g., Haiti 
Agreement Lets Rights Violators Off Hook-Amnesty, Agence France Presse, Sept. 20, I 994, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Haiti Agreement Lets Rights Violators Off Hook] (reporting Amnesty 
International's finding that the agreement "was tantamount to a blank check for rights violators in Haiti"). 
7. See Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2543 n.36. During the last 25 years, numerous countries have turned from 
dictatorship to elected civilian government. In the 1970s, three countries in southern Europe (Portugal, Greece, 
and Spain) experienced such transitions. In the 1 980s, I I Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) and 15 African countries moved 
away from repressive one-party or military rule and held democratic multiparty elections. In tl1e 1990s, the former 
Soviet Republics, El Salvador, South Africa, a.r1d finally Haiti are having to grapple with tl1eir repressive pasts. 
Of these, amnesty Jaws or decrees have been adopted in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Suriname, and Uruguay. 
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domestic prosecution to leaders of prior goverru:ilents for their gross violations of human 
rights9 has become the focus of one of the most important and heated debates in modern 
international law. 10 To date, most of the scholarly writing on the subject has been in the 
abstract, glossing over the political realities and jurisprudential nuances that come into play 
in a specific factual context. 11 In this way, these writings have been afflicted by what 
Professor Bruno Simma describes variously as ''wishful thinking,'' ''missionary 
aspirations," and "human rights vigilantism." 12 In contrast, this Article, which is written 
from the perspective of a former State Department lawyer and delegate to the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights, explores the amnesty question through the critical lens of v 
a concrete case study: the amnesty given to the military leaders in Haiti as part of the peace 
accords in I 994, negotiated under the auspices of the United States and the United Nations. 
Morris Abrams, the former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, recently remarked: 
It is a very tough call whether to point the finger or try to negotiate with people. 
As a lawyer, of course, I would like to prosecute everybody who is guilty of 
these heinous things. As a diplomat or as a politician or as a statesmen, I also 
would like to stop the slaughter, bring it to a halt. You have two things that are 
in real conflict here ... I don't know the proper mix. 13 
By examining the political realities of the Haiti situation and the applicable provisions of 
treary and customary law, this Article seeks to assess whether the Haitian amnesty did 
indeed achieve "a proper mix." To this end, the Article begins with a description of the 
abuses reportedly committed by Haiti's military regime and the international community's 
attempts to restore the democratically-elected government to power. Next, it explores the 
policy arguments for and against amnesty as applied to the Haitian situation and analyzes 
the scope of both the Haitian amnesty law and President Aristide' s amnesty decree. This 
section is followed by a detailed analysis of the relevant international instruments and 
8. The tenn "amnesty" is derived from the Greek word amnestia, which means forgetfulness or oblivion. 
Nonnan Weisman, A History and Discussion of Amnesty, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 520 (1972). An amnesty 
is an act of sovereign power "decriminalizing" a past offense. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PROGRESS REPORT ON TilE QUESTION OF TilE IMPUNITY OF 
PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.211993/6 at 12 (1993) [hereinafter 
PROGRESS REPORT]. Amnesty is generally exercised on behalf of certain classes of persons who are subject to trial 
but have not yet ·been prosecuted or convicted. A pardon is to be contrasted from amnesty in that it does not 
overlook the offense or expunge the conviction. Weisman, supra, at 530. 
9. In this Article, the tenns "gross violations of human rights," "atrocities," "human rights abuses," and 
"human rights crimes" are used interchangeably to indicate acts such as murder, disappearances, rapes, and torture, 
which would qualify as crimes against humanity assuming they were committed as part of state policy on a mass 
scale. See the discussion of the definition of crimes against humanity in note 218 i'lfra. 
I 0. See generally 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FoRMER REGIMES 
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Kritz, 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. 
I l. The leading articles in this area are Orentlicher, supra note 1, and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State 
Responsibility to Investigate and Prosec:Ute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 
451 (1990). For a notable exception to this trend, see IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY]. The chapter dealing with the situation in 
Haiti, written by Irwin Stotzky, however, "is severely handicapped by its having gone to press in the midst of the 
surprising chain ofevimts in late 1994." Joan Fitzpatric, Nothing But the Truth? Transitional Regimes Confront 
the Past, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 713, 720 n.49 (1995) (reviewing IMPUNITY, supra). 
12. See BRUNO SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 165, 218, 232 (1995). 
13. Roy Gutman, War Crime Unit Hasn't a Clue: U.N. Setup Seems Designed to Fail, NEWSDA Y, Mar. 4, 
1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
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customary law that potentially limit a government's prerogative to issue an amnesty. While 
the Article's main focus is the i11temational law applicable to the Haitian situation, this 
inquiry has far-reaching implications beyond Haiti's shores, which are explored i..n the 
Conclusion. 
TI. T-HE SITUATION IN HAITI 
A. Atrocities Committed by the Military Regime 
On December 16, 1990, Jean-BertrandAristide, a Catholic priest, garnered sixty-seven 
percent of the vote in a U.N.-monitored election to become Haiti's first democratically 
elected President. 14 Just eight months later, the Haitian military overthrew Aristide's 
civilian government in a coup, which unleashed a massive outbreak of the worst imaginable 
human rights violations. 15 Aristide and high ranJdng members of his government were 
forced into exile while the military forces consolidated their rule through ruthless repression 
and violence against those perceived as Aristide supporters and those deemed to resist 
military rule, including members of the clergy, the judicial system, radio stations, trade 
unions, and popular associations. 16 
According to the 1994 U.S. Department of State Interim Human Rights Report on 
Haiti 17 and the reports of various human rights groups, 18 over 3,000 Haitian civilians were 
murdered by the military regime during Aristide's 1,111 days in exile. 19 These sources 
also indicate that during this period the peopie of Haiti were subjected to state-sanctioned 
massacres/0 disappearances and assassinations,21 widespread political rapes/2 arbitrary 
14. See Haiti Elections Preceded by Turbulent History, Reuters, June 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Haiti Elections]. Haiti attained its independence from France in 1804, but was 
occupied by the United States from 1915 to 1934. From 1957 to 1986, Haiti was ruled as a dictatorship by 
Francois Duva!ier (Papa Doc) and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc). From 1986 to the election of Aristide 
in 1990, Haiti had a succession of military-ruled governments. From Slave Colony to Statehood, 1RJSH TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 1994, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File. 
15. See Haiti Elections, supra note 14. 
i 6. See AMERICAS WATCH, NAT'L COALITION FOR l-lAJTJAN REI'UGEES, & PHYSICIANS FOR HUJvLA_N :RlGHTS, 
RETURN TO THE DARKEST DAYS: HUMAN RlGHTS IN HAITI SINCE TI-lE COUP 1 ( 1991) [hereinafter RETURN TO THE 
DARKEST DAYS]. 
17. John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Address at a State 
Department Press Briefing (Sept. 13, 1994), in Tfle Crisis in Haiti, supra note 3. See also HUMAN RlGHTS WATCH 
& NAT'L COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, RAPE IN HAITI: A WEAPON OF TERROR 2 (1994) [hereinafter RAPE 
IN HAITI]. 
18. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RlGHTS, HAITI: A HUMAN RlGHTS NIGHTMARE (1992); RETURN TO 
THE DARKEST DAYS, supra note 16 (1992); NAT'L COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES & AMERlCAS WATCH, 
SILENCING A PEOPLE: THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN HAITI (1993) [hereinafter SILENCING A PEOPLE]; 
AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE THE. COUP 
(1992); AMNESTY INfERNATIONAL, HAITI: HUMAN RlGHTS HELD RANSOM (1992). 
19. Others put the number killed at over 4,000 people. See, e.g., Andrew Downie, Haitians Debate Amnesty 
for Coup Leaders, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Ocl 8, 1994, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; 
Haitians Mourn On Anniversary of Coup, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1995, at 21. Human rights groups alleged the 
U.S. Administration purposely underestimated casualty figures to justify the U.S. rejection of Haitian asylum-
seekers. RAPE IN HAITI, supra note 17, at 22. Human rights organizations have acknowledged, however, that 
casualty figures in the major Haitian towns and cities are notoriously difficult to substantiate and figures for the 
countryside do not exist. RETURN TO THE DAJUCEST DAYS, supra note 16, at 3. 
20. For exarnple, in Cite Soleil, a vast neighborhood of slums on the edge of Port-au-Prince, soldiers killed 
from 50 to 150 people ostensibly in reprisal for the lynching of two soldiers. See RETURN TO THE DAJUCEST DAYS, 
supra note 16, at 4. 
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arrests and detentions in inhumane conditions/3 and torture.24 The persons allegedly 
responsible for these abuses were the leaders of the military junta-namely, Lieutenant 
General Raoul Cedras, Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, and many of the 7,000 members 
of the Armed Forces of Haiti under their command. Also implicated were Haiti's 500 
section chiefs (rural sheriffs, integrated into the army and reporting to the local sub-district 
commanders), their attaches (armed civilian auxiliaries that served as death squads), and the 
members of FRAPH (Front pour I 'Avancement et le Progres d'Haiti), a quasi-political 
organization armed by the Haitian military.25 
During his nationally-televised address on September 15, 1994, President Clinton 
offered the following description of the atrocities in Haiti: 
Cedras and his armed thugs have conducted a reign of terror-executing children, 
raping women, and killing priests. As the dictators have grown more desperate, 
the atrocities have grown ever more brutal. Recent news reports have document-
ed the slaying of Haitian orphans by the nation's deadly police thugs. The 
dictators are said to suspect the children of harboring sympathy toward President 
Aristide for no other reason than he ran an orphanage in his days as a parish 
priest ... International observers uncovered a terrifying pattern of soldiers and 
policeman raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents-
young girls, 13 years old, 16 years old. People were slain and mutilated, with 
body parts left as warnings to terrify others. Children were forced to watch as 
their mothers' faces were slashed with machetes.26 
Summing up the situation in Haiti from September 1991 to October 1994, the spokesman 
for the American Embassy in Haiti concluded that the "[h]uman rights violations were 
among the worst in the world-if not in scale, certainly in degree. " 27 
B. International Efforts to Reinstate the Aristide Government 
In an effort to facilitate the return of the democratically-elected government to Haiti 
and bring an end to the human rights abuses of the Haitian military regime, the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) appointed Dante Caputo, the former 
21. The most egregious examples were the extra-judicial execution of Justice Minister Guy Malary and the 
abduction and disappearance of Port-au-Prince Chief Prosecutor Laraque Exantus, who had been responsible for 
several sensitive criminal investigations into cases involving the military and paramilitary groups. See NAT'L 
COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, NO GREATER PRIORITY: JUDICIAL REFORM IN HAITI 2 (1995) [hereinafter No 
GREATER PRIORITY]. 
22. Before being expelled from Haiti, the United Nations/Organization of American States International 
Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) documented 66 cases of politically motivated rape committed by military, 
police, and paramilitary forces during a five-month period. See RAPE IN HAITI, supra note 17, at 3, 17, 19. 
23. According to MICIVIH, in 1993, detainees were incarcerated in facilities lacking electricity, potable water, 
toilets, and medical supplies. Men, women, and children were kept together in close, overcrowded quarters, and 
prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor. Sexual abuse and disease were rampant. See No GREATER PRIORITY, 
supra note 21, at 5. 
24. According to a State Department human rights report, "the de facto authorities routinely employed brutal 
beatings with fists and clubs, torture, and other cruel treatment on detainees." See Haiti Human Rights Practices, 
1994, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
25. Hereinafter, "the military regime." 
26. President Bill Clinton, Oval Office Address to the Nation (Sept 15, 1994), in The Crisis in Haiti, supra 
note 3. 
27. Stan Schrager, USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing, Federal News Service, Nov. 15, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
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Argentine foreign minister, to serve as mediator between the "de facto military govern-
ment"28 and the government-ill-exile. Caputo's first goal was to convince the military 
regime to allow entry into Haiti of a U.N./OAS human rights monitoring mission.29 While 
Caputo originally pushed for a team of 500 personnel, the military regime ultimately 
consented to accept a group of only eighteen observers.30 When the military subsequently 
refused to act on the mission's complaints about specific violations31 and after Caputo's 
repeated attempts to persuade the military leaders to meet with Aristide proved futile, the 
U.N. Security Council [Security Council] imposed a worldwide oil and weapons embargo 
(enforced by a cordon of international shipping) and a worldwide freeze of Haitian 
government assets and the personal assets of the military leaders and their leading civilian 
supporters. 32 
With fuel growing scarce and the military regime's backers becoming increasingly 
anxious over the actions taken against them, the military leaders indicated their willingness 
to sit down with Aristide at the bargaining table and negotiate a settlement. The meeting 
took place from June 27 to July 3, 1993, at Governors Island in New York Harbor. During 
the meeting, Caputo and President Clinton's SpeCial Envoy, Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, 
were able to persuade the two sides to accept an agreement that called for: (1) the 
suspension of the Security Council-imposed sanctions after the confirmation of a new prime 
minister (Aristide supporter Robert Malva!), (2) the return of Aristide as President of Haiti 
on October 30, 1993, (3) the "early retirement" of General Raoul Cedras, and ( 4) "an 
amnest-y granted by the President of the Republic within the framework of article 147 of the 
National Constitution.' ' 33 
Under pressure from Caputo and Pezzullo, Aristide reluctantly acquiesced to the 
amnesty clause of the Governors Island Agreement, 34 which, according to a senior Clinton 
Administration official, "is about as ambiguous as you can get with respect to what kind 
of amnesty is contemplated. " 35 Privately, however, Clinton Administration officials 
reportedly argued that a broad amnesty was necessary to satisfy the demands of the de facto 
rulers. 36 In fact, U.S. officials have acknowledged that during August and September of 
28. America and the World (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 22, 1994), available in LEXJS, News 
Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter America and the World]. With the ironic exception of the Holy See (the 
Vatican), no nation recognized the military regime as the legitimate government of Haiti. 
29. William G. O'Neill, Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: The Experience of the OASIU.N. 
Mission in Haiti, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 103 (1995). 
30. Jd. 
31. ld. at 111. 
32. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 119-20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) [hereinafter 
S.C. Res. 841]. 
33. See UNITED NATIONS, THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAlT!: REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/47/975-S/26063 (1993) (reproducing the text of the Governors Island 
Agreement). The Governors 1sland Agreement was supplemented by a document known as the New York Pact, 
which was signed by the two sides on July 16, 1993. Paragraph 4 of the New York Pact provides that "[t]he 
political forces and parliamentary blocs undertake to ensure that the following laws are passed, on the bases of an 
emergency procedure ... (ii) Act com;eming the amnesty." UNITED NATIONS, THE SJTUATION OF DEMOCRACY 
AND HUMAN RIGIITS IN HAlT!: REPORT OF 1liE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/47/IOOO-S/26297 (1993). The 
provision of the Haiti Constitution referenced in the Governors Island Accord provides in its entirety: "He [the 
President] may grant amnesty only for political matters as stipulated by law." HAlTIAN CONST. art. 147, reprinted 
in CONSTITUTIONS OF 1liE COUNTRJES OF 1liE WORLD: HAITI (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1987). 
34. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: Searching for Altematives, in IMPUNITY, supra note ll, at I 88 (Professor 
Stotzlcy served as Aristide's Legal Adviser while Aristide was in exile in the United States). 
35. White House Background Briefing, Federal News Service, Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXJS, News 
Libnuy, CURNWS File [hereinafter Briefing]. 
36. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & NAT'L COALITION FOR HA.lTIAN REFUGEES, TERROR PREVAILS IN HAITI: 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND FAILED D!PLOJv!ACY 35 (1994). 
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1993, they presented Prime Minister designate Malva] with drafts of amnesty laws similar 
to those passed in other countries, which covered not just crimes against the state but also 
serious human rights abuses against civilians.37 Aristide, for example, was reported to be 
very much influenced by the Salvadoran and South African approaches to amnesty in 
particular.38 El Salvador's National Reconciliation Act provides for an amnesty for all 
persons involved in political offenses or in ordinary offenses related to political ones.39 
South Africa's Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (then in draft) required 
the perpetrators of human rights crimes to acknowledge publicly their crimes as a 
precondition to receiving a pardon.40 
The Security Council immediately ''declared [its] readiness to give the fullest possible 
support to the Agreement signed on Governors Island,"41 which it later said constitutes 
''the only valid framework for the solution of the crisis in Haiti.' ' 4~ In accordance with 
the Goveq10rs Island Agreement, on August 27, 1993, the Security Council suspended the 
sanctions which it had imposed on the military regime.43 Nevertheless, it subsequently 
reinstated the embargo when the Haitian military expelled the U.N./OAS monitoring 
mission, effectively blocked Afistide's return, and turned away the U.S.S. Harlan County, 
which was carrying 200 peacekeeping troops to help with the transition.44 After renewed 
sanctions failed to dislodge the military leaders and reports of human rights abuses in Haiti 
continued,45 on July 31, 1994, the Security Council took the extreme step of authorizing 
an invasion of Haiti by a multinational force.46 
On the eve of the invasion on September 18, President Clinton sent a delegation-
consisting of former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell-to try to reach a last-minute agreement with the Haitian 
military leaders that would enable the sides to avoid armed conflict.47 Just minutes after 
American military aircraft had taken off toward Haiti, a deal was struck, whereby General 
Cedras agreed to retire his command ''when a general amnesty will be voted into law by 
the Haitian Parliament, or October 15, 1994, whichever is earlier." 48 Secretary of State 
Christopher stated for the record the U.S. interpretation of the amnesty agreed to by the 
United States-that it would be "a broad amnesty for all the members of the military. " 49 
As further inducement, the United States arranged for the top military leaders to receive 
37. !d. 
38. Weekend Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 23, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, 
CURNWS File [hereinafter Weekend Edition]. 
39. See Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 14 (1994). 
40. See Republic of South Africa Promotion ofNational Unity and Reconciliation Bill (on file with the Texas 
International Law Journal); see also Mandela Sets Commission on Crimes in Apartheid, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 
1995, at 6 (reporting its enactment into law). 
41. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 120, U.N. Doc. SIINF/49 (1993). 
42. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3298th mtg. at 126, U.N. Doc. SllNF/49 (1993). 
43. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 327lst mtg. at 121, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993). 
44. O'Neill, supra note 29, at 121. 
45. See S.C. Res. 940, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc: S/RES/940 (1994) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 940]. The 
Security Council stated that it was '' [g]ravely concerned by the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of 
civil liberties .... " · 
46. !d.~ 4. 
4 7. See President Bill Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation (Sept. I 7, 1994 ), in The Crisis in Haiti, supra note 
3. 
48. Haitian Lawmakers Pass Partial Amnesty to Pressure Cedras, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 8, 1994, 
at lA, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
49. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, White House Press Briefing on Haiti (Sept. 19, 1994), U.S. 
Newswire, Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
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political asylum in Panama, transported them on a U.S.-suppliedjet to their new home, gave 
their relatives safe passage to the United States, freed their money held in U.S. banks, and 
even agreed to rent thJee of General Cedras' estates in Haiti at a monthly fee of twelve 
thousand dollars. 50 Administration sources were quoted as saying that the total cost to the 
United States for sending the military leaders into exile could "run into the millions. " 51 
In addition, a senior presidential advisor said that the fortune thought to belong to the 
military leaders had never been found and presumably remained under their control. 52 
C. Swapping Amnesty for Peace 
Normally, the way a new civilian government chooses to deal with the crimes of the 
former regime reflects the new government's perception of its strength. The more durable 
the government perceives itself, the more likely it is to choose prosecution over less invasive 
options-such as making monetary reparations to the victii11S or their families, establishi.'lg 
a truth commission to document the abus·es and perhaps identify perpetrators by name, 
instituting employment pans and purges that keep abusers from positions of public trust, or 
providing amnesty to some or all of the perpetrators. 53 In· this respect, every new 
government's situation is perhaps unique, but the Haitian situation was altogether 
unprecedented in that the choice to pursue amnesty rather than prosecution of the military 
leaders was by and large imposed upon the Aristide government by the United States and 
the United Nations, who had their own interests which did not necessarily correspond vvith 
the long-term interests of the Aristide government. 
l. The Interests of the United States and United Nations 
The reason the United States pushed Aristide to make concessions on the Haitian 
military regime's accountability for its crimes was, as one commentator noted, that the 
United States "was afraid of getting lost in voodoo politics, haunted by the ghosts of 
American soldiers killed in Somalia, [and] horrified of sinking into a quagmire like 
Vietnam." 54 The other members of the U.N. Security Council, in tum, perceived the 
Haitian situation as largely an American problem and were therefore satisfied to yield to 
U.S. interests in resolving it.55 · 
50. Aristide Reinstated As Haiti's President, FACTS ON FILE WORLb NEWS DIG., Oct. 20, 1994, at AI, 
available in LE)GS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Aristide Reinstated]. 
51. Ed Timms, Haiti Gets Ready to Welcome Back Exiled Aristide, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 14, 1994, 
at lA, 26A. 
52. Frank J.Murray, Arislide JJ,fakes Clear Call: No Violence, WASil. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, at AI, available 
in LEXJS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
53. A fourth alternative would be to seek trial of such persons before an international criminal court as has 
been done for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. "[T]ribunal fatigue," however, has prevented the Security 
Council from expanding the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia/Rwanda tribunal to cover situations in other countries 
that cry out for an international judicial response. Meaningful efforts to establish a permanent international criminal 
court are still years away from fruition. International courts are therefore unlikely in t11e near future to serve as 
a forum in lieu of domestic prosecution. See VIRGINIA MORJUS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, I AN INSIDER's GUIDE 
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRJMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 352-54 (1995) [hereinafter] MOIV'\JS 
& SCHARF]. 
54. America and the World, supra note 28. 
55. See Dominic Law.son, 111e Pressure of Gunboat Diplomacy: Britain has Offered the US Two Warships to 
Help Invade Haiti, FIN. TIMES, Sept 3, 1994, available in WESTLA W as 1994 WL 12667690. Lawson, through 
his musings on the United Kingdom's offer to assist in the restoration of democracy in Haiti, provides the reader 
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Both the United States and United Nations saw the carrot of amnesty, together with the 
stick of threatened force, as the best way to persuade the military leaders to step down 
without a fight. It was thought that the anticipation of prosecution and punishment would 
encourage the military leaders to fight to retain power, much as Bosnian Serb leaders 
initially became more intransigent in the face of prosecution before the International 
Tribunal created by the Security Council. 56 Despite its saber rattling, the United States did 
not want to send troops into Haiti without the consent of the military regime. During a 
press briefing, a Senior Administration official acknowledged: "From our perspective the 
fundamental and most important objective ... [was the] ability to permissively put 15,000 
multinational forces in the country.' '57 President Clinton said he believed the amnesty deal 
was necessary to avoid ''massive bloodshed and perhaps an extended period of occupation 
that could have been troubling to our country and to the world."58 
A second and related reason for amnesty reflected concern that the newly installed 
democratic government would be unlikely to survive the destabilizing effects of politically 
charged trials without massive foreign military support. A reinstated democracy in Haiti 
was bound initially to be a frail construct, and Haiti was prone to remain a polarized 
society-with the members of the military, the section chiefs, the attaches, and members of 
FRAPH constituting a continued threat to the civilian government.59 Under these 
circumstances, a decision to prosecute members of the military regime might have appeared 
"inappropriate, and even nonsensical-if not downright dangerous. " 60 
Experience in other countries had proven that efforts to pmsecute often induce the 
military to close ranks, challenge democratic institutions, 61 or attempt to overthrow the 
incipient democratic government. The Argentina case, in particular, likely weighed heavily 
with an insight into the views of many foreigners of U.S. foreign policy: 
Id 
This is the usual post cold war charade, of course, in which the U.S. uses a tame U.N. to give 
international legitimacy to the pursuit of its own very particular foreign policy objectives. We saw 
the same thing in Somalia, and-though here the international interest was genuinely widespread-
Kuwait. 
But it is not enough for the American to have Britain's signature to the policy they wish to carry out. 
They also want us to make the pretence of an 'international task force' even more believable by the 
actual involvement of non-American troops. And for some reason the State Department considers 
Britain the most useful stooge in such endeavours. 
56. See Elaine Sciolino, Bosnian Talks Snag on Fate of Two Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A3. See 
generally Anthony D' Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. 1. INT'L L. 500--06 (1994). 
· 57. Briefing, supra note 35 (emphasis added). 
58. President Bill Clinton, Remarks at White House Press Conference (Sept. 19, 1994), in The Crisis in Haiti, 
supra note 3. Based on the Clinton Administration's actions in Haiti, and more recently in Bosnia, political 
analysts have concluded that "[r]isk avoidance appears to have acquired the force of doctrine at the Pentagon. In 
the Clinton administration, the concern borders on an obsession with both military and civilian leaders whose view 
on the use of force was molded by the war in Vietnam." Chris Black, US Options Seen Fewer as Military Avoids 
Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, I995, at 12. 
59. Indeed, after the return of Aristide, it was reported that the attaches and local chieftains had retained their 
weapons and had found refuge in the hills and remote communities throughout the Haitian countryside. America 
and the World, supra note 28. 
60. Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2611. 
61. In 1986, when military defendants refused to respond to summonses issued by Uruguayan courts to appear 
before them to answer charges relating to rights violations committed in the I 970s, President Julio Maria 
Sanguinetti "hastily pushed" through Congress an amnesty law covering the controverted prosecutions, thereby 
averting a challenge to the supremacy of civilian institutions with which the government was not prepared to deal. 
ld. at 2545 n.28. 
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in t.he minds of the U.S. and U.N. negotiators. In Argentina, the humiliation suffered by 
t.he army in the Falkland Islands conflict with the United Kingdom led to the collapse of 
military rule and the establishment of a democratically-elected government detem1ined to 
prosecute the abuses committed by the former regime, which had been responsible for the 
disappearance of some 9,000 persons during the "dirty war." 62 However, members of the 
military responded to prosecutions of military officers by launching a series of rebellions 
during the 1980s against the civilian government of President Raul Alfonsin,63 who was 
forced to call a premature end to the ill-fated proceedings.64 Alfonsin's successor as 
president, Carlos Saul Menem, thereafter pardoned the junta leaders that had already been 
convicted. 65 
While there have also been some notable success stories in prosecuti.J1g members of 
former regimes, such as Greece in the mid-1970s66 and more recently Ethiopia, 67 tolerance 
in the handling of past abuses was seen as the more prudent course to pursue for Haiti.6u 
In essence, the attitude was that ''there is a dragon living on the patio and we had better not 
provoke it,' ' 69 especially since the United States and the United Nations lacked the political 
will to commit troops in a combat situation in Haiti. At the constant prodding of Caputo 
and Pezzullo, Aristide reluctantly acquiesced in the view that democratic consolidation could 
best be furthered by implementing a policy of reconciliation embodied in an amnesty law 
covering past violations. Thus, in explaining his support for the amnesty, Aristide said: 
''This amnesty is part of the reconciliation and rebuilding process. Let our commitment to 
peace be our contribution to democracy. " 70 The amnesty deal had its desired effect: 
62. See id. at 2545 n.27. 
63. Jd. 
64. Jd. Professor Orentlicher has argued that the chief lesson of the Argentina experience is not that 
prosecutions are destabilizing per se but that prosecutions of indefinite duration and scope are likely to destabilize. 
For support of this thesis, Orentlicher notes that the rebellions did not begin during the trials of the top military 
commanders, but only after prosecutions began to sweep more broadly, thereby tarnishing the military 
institutionally. Dianne F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim 
Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGEl-IDA FOR TilE NEXT CENTURY 438 (Louis Henkin & John L. Hargrove 
eds., 1995). 
65. Tina Rosenberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 146, 146 (1995) (discussing 
Latin America and Eastern Europe's struggle to reconcile the dictatorships of the past with the democracies of the 
future). 
66. One of the few countries where large scale prosecutions and disciplinary proceedings took place is Greece. 
After the Colonels lost power in 1974, the civilian regime tried both tl1e military leaders of the former regime and 
hundreds oflower-ranking military officers accused of having committed torture. Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 13. 
67. In Ethiopia, trials have recently commenced of some 3,000 officials oftl1e fallen Mengistu regime for their 
human rights crimes. See Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing 
with the Past, in Kritz, 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 335. See also Ethiopia, Report of/he Office 
of the Special Prosecutor (Feb. 1994), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 107 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Kritz, 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. 
68. ln an interview with wire reporters on September !4, President Clinton explained his continued support 
of amnesty for members of the military regime: ''In the Governors Island Agreement the military leaders and the 
police leaders were promised safe exit. And yes, this is horrible, but the most important thing we can do is to 
quickly create a spirit of reconciliation and to try to move to a point where we can do that." President Bill 
Clinton, Remarks in Interview by Wire Reporters (Sept. 14, 1994), U.S. Newswire, Sept. 15, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
69. Huyse, supra note 67, at34l. 
70. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Remarks in the East Room of the White House at the Meeting of tl1e 
Multi-National Force Coalition (Sept. 16, 1994), in 17Ie Crisis in Haiti, supra note 3. Aristide's remarks were 
almost identical to the justification of the Uruguay amnesty law provided 7 years earlier by Uruguayan President 
Julio Maria Sanguinetti: 
The Uruguayan government has decided to take measures of magnanimity or clemency utilizing a 
mechanism provided for in the Constitution of the Republic (the amnesty). The 12 years of 
1996] SWAPPING AMNESTY FOR PEACE 11 
Aristide was permitted to return to Haiti and reinstate a civilian government, the military 
leaders left the country, much of the military surrendered their arms, and most of the human 
rights abuses promptly ended-all with practically no bloodshed or resistance. 71 
In the short run, the amnesty achieved far mcire for the restoration of human rights in 
Haiti than what would have resulted by insisting on punishment and risking political 
instability and continued social divisiveness. . Yet, the amnesty deal in Haiti may have 
jeopardized broader, long term interests of the United States and United Nations. A problem 
inherent in amnesties that are given the imprimatur of the international community is that 
they invariably encourage rogue regimes in other parts of the world to engage in gross 
abuses. For example, history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish 
officials responsible for the massacre of over one million Armenians during World War I 
encouraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Germany could pursue his 
genocidal policies with impunity.72 In 1939, in relation to the acts of genocide and 
aggression committed by German forces, Hitler remarked, ''Who after all is today speaking 
about the destruction of the Armenians?" 73 
· When the international community encourages or even merely condones an amnesty 
for human rights abuses, it sends a signal to other rogue regimes that they have nothing to 
lose by instituting repressive measures; if things start going badly, they can always bargain 
away their crimes by agreeing to restore peace. As one news analyst has pointed out, the 
United States' support for amnesty in Haiti "could weaken [its] moral authority in dealing 
with other rogue regimes abroad. Tiwse regimes now may think that behaving obnoxiously 
and dangerously is one way to exact tribute from Washington.' ' 74 In this regard, the Haiti 
precedent was all the more glaring coming as it did on the heels of the U.N. Security 
Council's decision to rescind the arrest order for Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and 
to release his followers from U.N. custody in an effort to ''foster a political dialogue which 
can lead to national reconciliation. " 75 
Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, and Graham Blewitt, his Deputy Prosecutor, publicly expressed their 
concern that those involved in the former Yugoslavia might seek to gain some precedent out 
of the Haitian amnesty: "If people look at this as being an avenue for obtaining peace, it 
hinders our work," Blewitt remarked.76 In particular, the Haitian action undermined the 
integrity of U.S. official statements that "the United States will never allow amnesty for 
dictatorship have left scars which will need a long time to heal and it is good to begin to do so. The 
country needs reconciliation to face a difficult but promising future. 
Letter from President Sanguietti to Amnesty International (Mar. 31, I987), reprinted in Orentlicher, supra note I, 
at 2545 n.26. 
71. Maggie O'Kane,After the Yanks Have Gone, GUARD~, Feb. IS, I995, at24, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, CURNWS File. 
72. I MORRJS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at xiv n.l. 
73. Hitler's Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals, Aug. 22, 1939, quoted in M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNJ, CRJMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 176 n.96 (1992). 
74. Jim Hoagland, Deal with Cedras Undermines Clinton's Moral Authority, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 
21, 1994, at 29A. 
75. See Statement of Ambassador Albright, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3315 (1993), quoted in 1 MoRRJs & SCHARF, 
supra note 53, at 342. Aidid was responsible for the murder of 24 U.N. peacekeeping troops in 1993. The 
Security Council initially passed a resolution authorizing Aidid's "arrest, and detention for prosecution, trial and 
punishment" See S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. SIINF/49 (1993). It 
rescinded this order, however, when Aidid stepped up attacks on U.N. troops. See S.C. Res. 885, U.N. SCOR, 48th 
Sess., 3315th mtg. at 86, U.N. Doc. SIINF/49 (1993). 
76. PeterS. Canellos, Amnesty Plan Worries UN War-Crimes Prosecutor, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct I, 1994, at 
8. 
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those who have committed atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, even as the price for a 
Balkan peace settlement.' ' 77 Yet, during the negotiations with the Haitia.n military leaders, 
these broader long-term concerns were eclipsed behind the overriding objective of avoiding 
American casualties in a military operation that did not have the support of the American 
people.73 
2. Countervailing Interests Supporting Prosecution 
Much has previously been written about the moral and ethical reasons for prosecuting 
leaders responsible for grave hlli-nan lights crimes, 79 and Jeaii-Bertrand Alistide, as a 
Catholic priest, may have been uniquely influenced by such considerations. There were also 
several important practical factors counseling against the granting of amnesty that explained 
Aristide's initial aversion to an amnesty-for-peace swap with the military leaders. As 
detailed below, prosecuting high-level mell)bers of the military regime could serve to 
discourage future human rights abuses in Haiti, deter vigilante justice, and reinforce respect 
for the law and the new democratic government. 
While prosecution and punishment can serve as a strong deterrence, impunity breeds 
contempt for the law and encourages future violations. The U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection ofMinorities 
have concluded that impunity is one of the main reasons for the continuation of grave 
violations of humai1 rights throughout the vvorld. 30 Indeed, fact-·fmding reports on Chile 
and El Salvador indicate that the granting of amnesty or de facto impunity has led to an 
increase in abuses in those countries.31 In this context, failure to prosecute human rights 
77. Carol Williams, No Amnesty for Perpetrators of Balkans Atrocities, U.S. Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, 
at A6. During the Bosnian Peace Negotiations in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, the Chief Prosecutor of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal formally asked the United States to make the surrender of indicted suspects a condition for 
any peace accord. See Stephen Engelberg, Panel Seeks U.S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 1995, at AI. The United States responded that it would not malce such a condition a "show stopper" to the 
larger peace settlement. Id. at A12. The final accord ultimately contained only a vague committment from the 
parties to "cooperate" with the Tribunal. Thereafter, Russia reportedly offered asylum from prosecution to General 
Ratko Mladic, the military leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who has been indicted by the Yugoslavia Tribunal for the 
crime of genocide, Dusko Doder, Russia is Said to Offer Asylum to Bosnian Serb, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1995, 
at 3, aild 1'~ATO troops reportedly pern1itted Radovan Karadzic, i.ht: ieader of the Bosnian Serbs who \Vas indicted 
for war crimes by the International Tribunal, to pass unhindered through NATO checkpoints. Dean Murphy, 
Bosnia Pact Reported on War Crimes, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1996, at 2. 
78. Inside Politics (CNN Television broadcast, Sept. 19, 1994), available in Lmas, News Library, CURNWS 
File. 
79. See generally ASPEN lNST., STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMEtrr OR PARDON-PAPERS AND REPORT OF THE 
CONFERENCE (1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES]. 
80. Paragraph 344 of the 1990 reportofthe Working Group on Enforced orlnvoluntary Disappearances reads: 
Perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the phenomenon of disappearances may be 
that of impunity. The Working Group's experience over the past ten years has confirmed the age-old 
adage that impunity breeds contempt for law. Perpetrators of human rights violations, whether 
civilian or military, will become all the more brazen when they are not held to account before a court 
of law. 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Impunity, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1990/l3, reprinted in Kritz, 3 TRANSiTIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 19. 
81. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF TilE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, U.N. 
Doc. A/38/385 at 146 (1983) (impunity enjoyed by Chilean security forces "is the cause, and an undoubted 
encouragement in the commission, of multiple violations of fundamental rights."). See also Ed Broadbent, 
Opinion, TORONTO STAR, Oct 20, 1994, at A1.7, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (reporting 
that human rights groups have documented an increase in the number of extra-judicial executions and death threats 
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crimes in a country like Haiti-which has suffered from an endless cycle of violence and 
abuse going back nearly two hundred years-could serve as a virtual license to repeat the 
crimes. 82 
The past decade has seen the rise of revisionist arguments that try to challenge 
historical facts in order to deny them or tone them down, thereby ridding them of their 
character of extreme gravity.83 A significant benefit of prosecutions is that they establish 
an authoritative record of abuses that can withstand the challenge of revisionism. While 
there are various means to achieve a full accounting of the truth, 84 the most authoritative 
rendering of the truth is possible only through the crucible of a trial that accords full due 
process. Criminal trials can generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of 
violations, how they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave 
the orders, and who carried them out. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, said that one of the most important legacies of the Nuremberg 
trials following World War II was that they documented the Nazi atrocities "with such 
authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the 
future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed 
people.' ' 85 The granting of amnesty, in contrast, encourages the guilty to try to escape the 
judgment of history by reinventing the truth. If, to paraphrase George Santayana, a society 
is condemned to repeat its mistakes when it has not learned the lessons of the past,86 then 
it is more likely to do so when it fails to take steps to establish an authoritative record that 
can endure the test of time and resist the forces of revisionism. 
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. While a state may 
appropriately forgive crimes against itself, such as treason, serious crimes against persons, 
such as rape and murder, are an entirely different matter. Holding the violators accountable 
since the Salvadoran legislature voted in March of 1993 for a "broad, absolute and unconditional amnesty."). 
82. According to the London-based human rights group Amnesty International, ''[!Jetting killers and torturers 
off the hook undermines long-term solutions to the country's continuing human rights crisis because it sends a 
message that they can continue their abuses." Haiti Agreement Lets Rights Violators Off Hook, supra note 6. 
83. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. 
84. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Tmth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, in 
Kritz, I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 223. Indeed, 1he day the Haitian amnesty decree was enacted, 
the Parliament also approved legislation establishing a truth commission and a fund to compensate victims of 
human rights abuses committed since the military seized power three years ago. Larry Rohter, Haitian Bill Doesn't 
Exempt Military from Prosecution, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1994, § I, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
CURNWS File. In December 1994, Aristide formed a seven-member commission to investigate crimes committed 
in Haiti during his exile. Claudio R. Santorum & Antonio Maldonado, Political Reconciliation or Forgiveness for 
Murder-Amnesty and its Application in Selected Cases, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 15, 15 (1995). Truth 
commissions, however, are a poor substitute for prosecutions. They do not have prosecutory powers such as the 
power to subpoena witnesses or punish perjury. Hayner, supra, at 228. They are inherently vulnerable to 
politically imposed limitations and manipulation: their structure, mandate, resources, access to information, 
willingness or ability to take on sensitive cases, and strength of final report are all largely determined by political 
forces at play when they are created. /d. at 244. When truth commissions name perpetrators, they impose the 
moral punishment of public condemnation, sometimes combined with the sanction of lustration (the disqualification 
from public office). Truth commissions' institutional limitations, however, prevent them from providing those 
named as perpetrators with the panoply of rights available to a criminal defendant Jd at 252-55. Finally, to the 
extent that the establishment of a truth commission purports to replace criminal punishment, it diminishes the 
authority of the legal process by implicitly conceding that the "machinery of justice" lacks the power to punish 
even those crimes that any civilized society views as most injurious. Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2546 n.32. 
85. See Justice Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President (June 7, 1945), reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 
184 (Supp. 1945) (stressing the importance of prosecuting Nazi leaders). 
86. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 588 (Justin Kaplan ed., 1992) (quoting George Santayana in his 
I THE LIFE OF REAsoN (1905-06)). 
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for their acts is a dut-y owed to the victims and their families. 37 Prosecuting and punishing 
the violators would give significance to the victims' suffering and serve as partial remedy 
for their injuries.88 Moreover, prosecutions help restore victims' dignity and prevent 
private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, would take it into their own 
hands. 89 In Haiti, the risk of vigilante justice is not a mere theoretical concern. Following 
the downfall of President Jean Claude Duvalier in February 1986, lynch mobs took justice 
into their own hands and executed soldiers, members of the Ton tons Macoutes, and others 
suspected of being involved in the brutalities committed by the Duvalierists. 90 Likewise, 
Haitian citizens who have suffered at the hands of the military regime have confided to 
reporters and human rights observers that they were likely to seek personal revenge if the 
military leaders responsible for their suffering are not able to be brought to justice.91 The 
inevitable occurred on October 3, 1995, when one of the highest ranking members of the 
military regime to remain in Haiti, former General Henri Max Mayard, was gunned down 
in. his car as he drove down a busy thoroughfare in Port-au-Prince.92 
While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the significance of the law by 
displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible for widespread 
human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of "law and distrust toward the 
political system.93 To the victims of human rights crimes, amnesty represents the ultimate 
in hypocrisy: while they struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are 
allowed to enjoy a comfortable retirement-in this case, subsidized by the United States.9' 
When those with power are seen to be above the law, the ordinary citizen will never come 
to beiieve in the principle of the rule of law as a flilldamental necessity in a democratic 
country. 95 - -
What a new or reinstated democracy like Haiti's needs most is legitimacy, whicl: 
cannot be achieved by an international accord or 20,000 foreign troops; what is requirec 
above all is a fair, credible, and transparent account of the events that took place and thE 
persons responsible. Consequently, prosecution of responsible leaders is ''necessary to asser 
the supremacy of democratic values and norms and to encourage the public to believe ir 
them.' ' 96 In the case of trials of military officers in particular, decisions of tribunal: 
reaffirm the authoritativeness and vigor of the new democratic institutions. Punishmen 
would enable a new government to assert its authority over individual and institutiona 
violators and thereby foster the observance of constitutional and other legal prescriptions.9 
Additionally, institutional disapproval of official policies that resulted in human rights abuse 
87. The Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, recently remarlcec 
"What politicians have the moral, legal or political right to forgive people charged witlr ... crimes agaim 
humanity ... without consulting the victims. I just find it abhorrent." UN Unit Warns on Amnesty in Wa 
Crimes, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 1995, at 7. 
88. Alice Henkin, Conference Report, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 79, at 3. 
89. Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 148. 
90. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RJGIDS, PAPER LAWS, STEEL BAYONETS: BREAKDOWN OF THE RULE C 
LAW IN HAlT! 196 (1990). 
91. See, e.g., Timms, supra note 51, at 26A; UNITED NATIONS, THE SITIJATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMA 
RIGHTS IN HAlTI: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/689 at 2 (1994) (reporting that "tt 
[Haitian] population in general felt strongly that human rights violations should not remain unpunished."). 
92. See Former General is Killed in Haiti, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 4. 
93. Henkin, supra note 88, at 3. See also Lisa L. Schmandt, Comment, Peace with Justice: Is It Possiblefi 
the Former Yugoslavia?, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 335, 336 (1995). 
94. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
95. Broadbent, supra note 81, at AJ.7. 
96. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE TlllRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21 
{1991). 
97. ld. 
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emphasizes the discontinuity between the policies and practices of the previous regime and 
the new govemment.98 Failure to prosecute, on the other hand, can give birth to conspiracy 
theories in which the leaders of the new regime are labeled as the hidden agents of the old 
order being treated in a suspiciously lenient way.99 · 
While prosecutions might initially provoke resistance, many analysts believe that 
national reconciliation cannot take place as long as justice is foreclosed. 100 Yet, the 
international community proved unwilling to pay the price for justice, which would have 
required sending troops into Haiti to dislodge the military regime and to protect the new 
government from rebellions while prosecutions of the military leaders were pending. 
D. Interpreting the Scope of the Haitian Amnesty 
In keeping with the September 18, 1994 Port-au-Prince agreement, Aristide provided 
the Haitian parliament with draft legislation that would authorize him to grant amnesty to 
the members of the military regime. 101 On October 6, 1994, Haiti's lower house, the 
Chamber of Deputies, voted fifty to two in favor of the legislation, 102 with the Haitian 
Senate following suit the next day by a vote of nine to one. 103 The newly enacted 
Amnesty Law provides as follows: 
Whereas, in order to end this crisis that is so cruelly eating away at the country, 
to the extent that the State's own existence is i..'Uperilled, ail Amnesty is likely to 
reconcile the nation with itself by covering it with a lawful shield of oblivion to 
general political events that disrupted the life of the nation; 
Article I: Article 3 of the law of 24 September 1860 is thus modified: the right 
to amnesty granted to the President by the Constitution only applies to political 
matters, that is to say in all cases of crimes and misdemeanors against the state, 
internal and external security, crimes and misdemeanors affecting public order 
and accessory crimes and misdemeanors as defined by the Penal Code. Amnesty 
can be declared either before or after prosecutions and even after convictions in 
absentia. 
Article 2: The Amnesty Order, issued with strict respect for the present law can 
in no case be revoked. 
98. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: T7ze Dilemma of Transitional Democratic 
Governments, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 79, at 81-82. 
99. Huyse, supra note 67, at 338. 
100. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2550 n.44 (citing Hannah Arendt's view that "men are unable to forgive 
what they cannot punish."). Prosecutions act as a sort of ritual cleansing. A country in which such cleansing 
remains unfmished will be plagued by continuous brooding and pondering. Postwar France, where the 
collaboration with the Nazis was never fully tried, provides the pardigmatic example. French historian Henri 
Rousso has labelled this absence "a never ending neurosis." Huyse, supra note 67, at 335, 338. 
101. Haiti: Military Strongmen Step Down After Receiving Amnesty, As Nation Prepares for Arislide 's Reh1rn, 
NoTISUR: LATIN AM. POL. AFF., Oct 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
1 02. Aristide Reinstated, supra note 50. 
103. Joseph B. Frazier, Haiti's Parliament OKs Amnesty, Paving the Way for Aristide 's Rehlrn, L.A. TIMEs, 
Oct. 9, 1994, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
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Article 3: The present law repeals all laws or clauses of the law; all decrees or 
clauses of the decree; all statutory orders or clauses of the statutory order that 
oppose it and will be enforced at the Minister of Justice's behest. 104 
Although the Amnesty Law was approved with little debate, the lawmakers emerged from 
the chambers of the Haitian parliament with widely divergent interpretations of the law's 
scope. For example, Senator Turneb Delpe of the National Front for Change and 
Democracy, the party on whose ticket Aristide was elected, took the position that "this 
amnesty is only for political matters. A rape is not a political matter." 105 Other members 
of· the parliament expressedc the view· that. the law ·protected the military rulers from 
prosecution for human rights abuses since it authorizes the President to grant amnesty for 
"accessory crimes and misdemeanors." 106 One member said in exasperation, "we 
approved the amnesty that Jean-Bertrand Aristide presented. Go· ask President Aristide if 
the text he sent down is restrictive or broad." 107 Another summed up the situation by 
saying that the complex and nebulous language of the legislation is such that "lawyers are 
going to be kept busy for years figuring mit what this ~eans." 108 
The Amnesty Law. authorizes amnesty for ''political matters,'' which it defmes as 
crimes and misdemeanors "against the internal and external security of the State" or 
"affecting the public order" as well as "accessory crimes and misdemeanors." Clearly, 
the law authorizes amnesty for pure political crimes against the state, such as treason or 
sedition. Consequently, the members of the military regime would not be prosecuted merely 
for their pa1"1:icipation in the coup. T'ne ·reference to ''accessory crimes and misdemeanors'' 
suggests that the law would also authorize amnesty for related political offenses-otherwise 
common crimes committed in connection with a political act or objective. In such cases, 
the question would be whether the nexus between the crime and the political act is 
sufficiently close for the crime to be deemed political under the amnesty law. For example, 
the killing of military forces loyal to Aristide during the October 1991 coup would probably 
be considered a political matter, but what about the so-called ''political rapes,'' detentions, 
torture or executions of' 'political opponents,'' and the massacres of civilians in reprisal for 
attacks against soldiers?109 
Since the issue of what constitutes a political offense is frequently raised in the context 
of extradition, the jurisprudence of extradition law may provide some guidance in answering 
this question. The U.S. case most closely on point is Artukovic v. Boyle, 110 which 
involved a request by the Government of Yugoslavia for the extradition of a former Interior 
Minister of the puppet Croatian government which took over a portion of Yugoslavia 
following the German invasion in April 1941. 111 Artukovic was charged with directing 
the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians in concentration camps between April1941 
104. Loi Relative a l'Amnistie,published in Le Moniteur, Journal Officiel de Ia Republique d'Haiti, Oct. 10, 
1994 (Haiti) (English translation on file with the Texas International Law Journal) [hereinafter Amnesty Law]. 
An English translation of Article I of the Haiti Amnesty Law is reproduced in O'Neill, supra note 29, at 123. 
105. Rohter, supra note 84, at 4. 
106. /d. 
107. ld. 
108. Id. 
109. See generally supra note 18. 
llO. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245, 246 (S.D. Cal. 1956), a.ff'd, Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 
198, 202 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 355 U.S. 393 (1958). This case has been described 
as "one of the most roundly criticized cases in the history of American extradition jurisprudence." Eain v. Wilkes, 
641 F.2d 504, 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
Ill. Karadzole, 247 F.2d 198. 
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and October 1942.112 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be a non-
extraditable political offense because it occurred during and in furtherance of the armed 
struggle to establish Croatia. 113 The court considered but was unpersuaded by the 
argument that Artukovic's crimes were so barbaric and atrocious that they could not be 
deemed political crimes. 114 
Some thirty years later, the Ninth Circuit in dictum determined that the Artukovic case 
had been wrongly decided because Artukovic had been charged with "carrying out a 
governmental policy calling for acts of destruction whose nature and scope ... exceeded 
human imagination ... [which] are certainly in our view to be excluded from coverage 
under the political offense exception." 115 Short of such acts, however, the Court made 
clear that ''the tactics that are used in ... internal political struggles are simply irrelevant 
to the question whether the political offense exception is applicable." 116 
The parallels between the Artukovic case and that of the Haitian military regime are 
self-evident. At least one commentator has noted that ''the Haitian killings were political 
in nature, somewhat like acts of war. " 117 In particular, the killings and rapes were part 
of an effort to establish a new regime and to consolidate power vis-a-vis those perceived as 
its opponents. To the extent that the Haitian abuses were not so numerous and heinous as 
to "exceed human imagination," one might conclude that they would fall within the 
political offense exception to extradition. By analogy, then, this extradition jurisprudence 
would suggest that the military regime's crimes could be considered political crimes for 
purposes of the Amnesty Law. 
To a large extent the question is moot since the Amnesty Law is designed to give 
discretion to Aristide to determine its scope. Indeed, the version that was adopted by the 
Haitian Senate was "punctiliously renamed the 'law relative to amnesty,' to underline that 
the members of the Senate were shifting full responsibility onto Aristide." 118 However, 
Aristide' s Amnesty Decree, issued the day after the Haitian Parliament enacted the Amnesty 
Law, was just as ambiguous as the Amnesty Law. The Decree provides amnesty for ''the 
authors and accomplices of the coup d'etat of 30 September 1991 which brought about the 
forced departure for exile of President of the Republic, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and his 
government." 119 It does not clarify whether the amnesty applies only to acts committed 
during the actual coup in 1991 or more generally to acts committed from 1991 to1994 in 
support of the military regime's efforts to consolidate power and repress opposition. 
While Aristide had previously said that he would not grant amnesty to any one engaged 
in "general or criminal actions," 120 after issuing the Amnesty Decree he confirmed that 
"there are no plans to prosecute members of the security forces and their allies" for their 
112. ld. at 202-04. 
113. ld. 
114. ld. at 205. 
115. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 774, 801 (9th Cir. 1986). 
116. ld. at 805. 
117. Jeffrey R. Brady, Aristide, Carter Use Best Diplomatic Tool: Forgiveness, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Sept 
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
118. One by One, the Key Figures of Haiti's Military Regime Bow Out, LATIN AM. WKL Y. REP., Oct. 20, 
1994, at 469, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter One by One]. 
119. Decree of Amnesty by Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Oct. 10, 1994 (copy in original French 
on file with the Texas International Law Journal); English translation by Michael Levy, Director of the 
International Liaison Office for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Aristide 
Amnesty Decree]. 
120. Kenneth Freed & Mark Fineman, Haitian Senate Sends Amnesty Bill to Aristide, LA. DMES, Oct. 8, 
1994, at A12. 
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human rights crimes. 121 Instead, following the South African and Salvadoran models; 
Aristide established a seven-member truth commission to investigate and document the 
human rights crimes committed in Haiti during his exile as well as a fund to compensate 
victims. 122 He also dismissed all Haitian military officers above the rank of major from 
Haiti's armed forces, 123 but that was as far as he would go to punish the leaders of the 
military regime. Indeed, Aristide personally requested Panamanian President Ernesto Perez 
to grant asylum to the top members of the military regime. 124 This action effectively 
precluded Haiti from pursuing their prosecution and punishment in the future, irrespective 
of how the Amnesty Law and Decree are interpreted. 125 
Ill. THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While the decision to grant amnesty to the military leaders in Haiti reflected a balance 
of ethical imperatives against political constraints, there is no indication that international 
law was factored into the equation. It is m~e thing to suggest that the decision to grant 
amnesty did not make sense from a broad policy perspective; it is quite another to conclude 
that the granting of amnesty violated international law. Were su~h a conclusion possible, 
the amnesty given to the military regime in Haiti could be invalidated in a proceeding before 
either the Haitian courts126 or an international forum. 127 In addition, given 'the United 
!21. Weekend Edition, supra note 38. A_ristide has, however, pursued prosecutions (mostly in absentia) of 
a few members of paramilitary groups and former members of the military and police for assassinations of his 
major supporters. See Judge Sentences 14 Haitians to Life, BosTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1995, at 4 (reporting the 
in absentia trial and conviction of Port-au-Prince police chief Michel Francois and 13 others who were accused 
of the 1993 assassination of leading Aristide supporter Antoine lzmery); Trial Begins in Haiti Killing, BosTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1995, at I I (reporting the trial of Gerard Gustave also for the assassination of Antoine Izmery); 
Haiti Convicts Ex-Army Officer, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, I995, at 13 (reporting on \he trial in absentia of former 
Lieutenant Jean Emery Piram, accused of killing Aristide supporter Jean-Claude Museau); John Goshko, Haitian 
Paramilitary Chief Held, Arrest Made by INS in New York, PLAIN DEALER, May 13, 1995, at 2 (reporting request 
by Aristide Government for the deportation of Emmanuel ''Toto'' Constant, leader of the FRAPH, who is wanted 
on murder charges). Unfortunately, most of these in absentia prosecutions amount to little more than "show 
trials," lasting a few short hours, with verdicts rendered within minutes. Telephone Interview with William 
O'Neill, Haitian Human Rights Observer (Sept. 20~ I995). Defendants tried in this manner are not able to inform 
their appointed counsel of any alibi or exculpatory circumstances to be weighed by the court. Thus, trials in 
absentia are generally disfavored under international law. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signahtre Dec. I9, 1966, art. I4, ~ 2(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176. 
122. See Santorum & Maldonado, supra note 84, at 15. 
123. See HUMAN RIGIITS WATCH, HAITI, SECURITY COMPROMISED: RECYCLED HAITIAN SOLDIERS ON THE 
POLICE FRONT LINE (1995). 
124. See Agence France Presse, Oct. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. In a note 
to Panamanian President Ernesto Perez, Aristide expressed gratitude for accepting Cedras and Biam!Jy. He claimed 
this would "help us bring peace and democracy to Haiti." !d. While Panama granted asylum to General Raoul 
Cedras and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, the third leader of the military junta, Port-au-Prince police chief 
Joseph Michel Francois, was granted asylum in the Dominican Republic. !d. 
I25. The Aristide Government could conceivably seek the prosecution of lower level members of the military 
regime who remain in Haiti. It would seem unfair; however, to hold the citizens and soldiers responsible for 
following the orders of the military commanders who had been granted de facto or de jure amnesty. See 1 MORRIS 
& SCHARF, supra note 53, at I I2-I4. 
126. When Salvadoran citizens brought suit before domestic courts in an attempt to have the El Salvador 
amnesty law declared invalid, the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador ruled that the granting of amnesty in 
these circumstances constituted a political question that the courts lacked competence to address. See El Salvador: 
Supreme Court of Justice Decision on the Amnesty Law, Proceedings No. 10-93 (May 20, I993), reprinted in 
Kritz, 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 549. However, the issue before the Court was the constitution-
ality of the amnesty law in relation to the powers of the legislature, not whether the amnesty law was invalid as 
a violation of international law. Indeed, the Court made clear that "there are cases where there is constitutional 
jurisdictional control over amnesty, and it is the competence of the Constitutional Chamber to pronounce itself over 
its [merits or lack of merits] ab initio, or to initiate proceedings, in accordance [with] the case, inasmuch as they 
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Nations' encouragement and. endorsement of the Haitian amnesty arrangement (as contained 
in the Governors Island Agreement), a determination that such amnesty violates international 
law would do serious damage to the credibility of the United Nations as an institution 
committed to the rule of law. 128 
The analysis that follows explores whether there existed an obligation under 
international law to prosecute the types of offenses committed by the Haitian military regime 
and whether such a duty was applicable to the Haiti situation. 
A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions 
The prerogative of a state to issue an amnesty for an offense can be circumscribed by 
treaties to which the state is a party. As Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties provides, "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for failure to perform a treaty." 129 Moreover, according to the Haitian 
Constitution, treaties to which Haiti is a party take precedence over domestic statutes 
whenever the two are in conflict.130 This combination of laws means that, under Haitian 
constitutional law, the Amnesty Law and any amnesties granted under its authority would 
be invalid if they conflicted with an obligation contained in a treaty to which Haiti is a 
party. 
There are several international conventions that clearly provide for a duty to prosecute 
the humanitarian or human rights crimes defined therein. Of particular note for the Haitian 
situation are the Geneva Conventions ofl949, the Genocide Convention, and the Torture 
Convention. 131 When these Conventions are applicable, the granting of amnesty to persons 
are filed before the Chamber." !d. 
I27. Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and Uruguay have been lodged 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States. See Orentlicher, 
supra note I, at 2540 n.S. 
I28. The U.N. Charter provides: 
The Purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles afjustice and internatianallaw, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
U.N. CHARTER art. I,~ I (emphasis added). 
129. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, May 23; 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (entered into force 
for Haiti on January 27, 1990), 'reproduced in BARRY E. CARTER & I'HILUP R 'TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SELECTED DocUMENTS 55 (1995) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
130. Article 276-2 of the Constitution of 1987, reproduced in CONSTITUTIONS OF TIIE· CoUNTRlES OF THE 
WORLD: HAITI 52 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., I987), provides that '' [ o ]nee international treaties 
or agreements are approved and ratified in ihe manner stipulated by the Constitution, they become part of the 
legislation of the country and abrogate any laws in conflict with them." This position contrasts sharply with the 
U.S. constitutional system, under which statutes and treaties are deemed to be of equal force, and whichever was 
enacted or ratified later in time controls where there is a conflict between the two. See United States v. Palestine 
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
13I. There are several other human rights conventions that provide a duty to prosecute, but which were clearly 
not applicable to the Haiti situation. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (entered into force July 18, I976), reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RJGHTS: A 
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HRJl/Rev.4 (Vol. 1/Part I) at 80, 83 (1993) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS]; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957), reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra, at 209, 211; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
20 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VoL 31:1 
responsible for committing the crimes defmed in these conventions would constitute a breach 
of a treaty obligation for which there can be no excuse or exception. 
1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
The four Geneva Conventions were negotiated in 1949 to codify the international rules 
relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory. Haiti is a 
party to the Geneva Conventions, as. is almost every other country in the world. 132 Each 
of the Geneva Conventions contains a specific enumeration of ''grave breaches,'' which 
constitute war crimes under international law for which there is individual criminal liability 
and for which states have a corresponding duty to prosecute. 133 Grave breaches include 
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great sufferiiJ.g or serious 
injury to body or health, extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity, 
willfully depriving a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement 
of a civilian 134-all of which are acts that were reportedly undertaken by the Haitian 
military regime. 135 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, prosecute, and 
punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, unless they choose to hand 
over such persons for trial by another state party. 136 The Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions, which is the official history of the negotiations leading to the adoption of these 
treaties, 137 confirms that the obligation to prosecute is ''absolute,; 7 n1eani..11g, inter alia, that 
state-parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators immunity or amnesty from 
prosecution for grave breaches of the Conventions. 138 
The duty to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is, however, 
limited to the context of international armed conflict. 139 There are two reasons why the 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (entered into force July 25, 1951 ), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS, supra, at 233, 234. 
132. As of February!, 1994, 185 states were party to the Geneva Conventions. See Edelenbos, supra note 
39, at 12 n.21 (1994). 
!33. See I MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 53, at 64-65. 
134. ld. 
135. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text. 
!36. See Article 51 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 311, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Article 52 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention II]; Article 131 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; and Article !48 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV). 
137. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 129, "[r]ecourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion, in order to ... determine the meaning" when the text of a treaty provision "leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure." 
138. See I MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 1!4 n.341, n.356. See also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 2i5 (i989) (discussillg how tie Geneva Conventions 
are not subject to derogation). 
139. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 54, 64-65, 114 n.356; but cj Jordan J. Paust, Applicability 
of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. J. 1NT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 511-12 
(1994) (arguing that serious violations of Common AJticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which apply to internal 
armed conflict, can also be deemed "grave breeches"). 
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Haiti situation from 1991 to 1994 cannot be deemed an international armed conflict for 
purposes of the Geneva Conventions. First, there is a high threshold of violence necessary 
to constitute a genuine armed conflict, as distinct from the lower level disturbances (such 
as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of fighting 140) that occurred in Haiti during the reign 
of the military regime. Second, notwithstanding the determination of the Security Council 
that the situation in Haiti constituted ''a threat to international peace and security in the 
region," 141 the violence in Haiti did not have an internationai character as recognized by 
the Geneva Conventions. 
The international conflict requirement derives from Common Article 2 of the four 
Geneva Conventions, which describes such conflicts as cases of declared war or any other 
armed conflict that may arise between two or more of the contracting powers, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them, and cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of the contracting party, even if such occupation meets no armed resistance. 142 
Prior to the introduction of the multinational troops in October of 1994, the situation in Haiti 
could not be deemed an armed cqnflict between Haiti and one or more foreign states. 
Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions did not preclude the· granting of amnesty to the 
Haitian military regime. 
2. The Genocide Convention 
The Genocide Convention entered into force on January 12, 1952, and 112 states 
including Haiti were parties as of December 31, 1993. 143 Like the Geneva Conventions, 
the Genocide Convention provides an absolute obligation to prosecute persons responsible 
for genocide as defined in the Convention. 144 The Convention defmes genocide as one of 
the following acts when committed ''with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such": 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.145 
140. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: lHEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 46 
(1987). For a discussion of the historical development of the notions of "war" and of "armed conflict," see 
Werner Meng, War, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (RudolfBemhardt ed., 1992); and Karl 
J. Partsch, Armed Conflict, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (RudolfBemhardt ed., 1992). 
141. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 32 (imposing economic sanctions); S.C. Res. 940, supra note 45 (authorizing 
invasion by multinational force). 
142. See Article 2 of Geneva Conventions I, ll, Ill, and IV, supra note 136. 
143. See Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 6. 
144. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: "[p ]ersons committing genocide or any of the acts 
enumerated in article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals." Article 5 requires states to "provide effective penalties" for persons guilty of genocide. 
Article 6 provides that "[p]ersons charged with genocide ... shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state 
in the territory of which the act was committed .... " Convention on the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277. 
145. !d. 
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Again, there are two reasons why the acts committed by the Haitian military regime 
would not meet this definition. First, it would be hard to argue that the abuses were 
committed with the specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. While the killings 
and abuses in Haiti were ostensibly intended to repress opposition, it would be extremely 
difficult to argue they were intended literally to destroy the opposition, especially since only 
about 3,000 people were killed out of the total population of six and a half million146 (a 
substantial majority ofwhich could be described as Aristide supporters). 147 Second, and 
even more importantly, the victims in Haiti do not constitute one of the designated groups 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention-namely, national, . ethnic, racial, or religious. 
Rather, the violence in Haiti was politically motivated. The target groups were persons who 
supported Aristide or opposed the military regime, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, 
race, or religion. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against ''political groups" from the 
Convention's defmition of genocide. 148 
The best case that could be made for. application of the Genocide Convention to the 
Haiti situation would focus on the arrests and attacks on Haiti's Catholic priests, nuns, and 
Church workers. 149 Here, a parallel could be drawn between the situations in Cambodia 
and in Haiti. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime killed over a million Cambodian 
civilians during the 1970s. 150 Like in Haiti, the violence was targeted primarily at 
opponents of the regime. 151 Nevertheless, the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on 
Genocide has stated that the Khmer Rouge was guilty of genocide "even under the most 
restricted defmition, since the victims included target groups such as ... Buddhist 
monks." 152 
However, there is a significant distinction between the Cambodian situation and· the 
situation in Haiti. While the Khmer Rouge murdered almost all the Buddhist monks in 
Cambodia, the Haitian regime mostly subjected the members of the Haitian clergy to 
temporary detentions and harassment, although there were a few extralegal executions and 
disappearances. 153 Consequently, it would be difficult to make the case that the treatment 
of the Catholic clergy triggered the Genocide Convention's duty to prosecute in the context 
of the situation in Haiti. 
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text 
147. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 773 {Robert Famighetti ed., 1995). 
148. The exclusion of"political groups" was due in large part to the fact that the Convention was negotiated 
during the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union and other totalitarian governments feared that they would face 
interference in their internal affairs if genocide were defined to include acts committed to destroy political groups. 
According to Professor Kuper, "one may fairly say that the delegates, after all, represented governments in power, 
and that many of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress political opposition." 
LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE 30 (1982). 
149. See SILENCING A PEOPLE, supra note 18, at Appendix A (listing names of priests, members of the 
seminary, nuns, monks and church workers that have been victims of repression during the reign of the military 
regime between 1991 and 1994). 
150. STEVEN R. RA1NER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING 140 (1995). 
151. DAVID P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY 285 (1991). 
152. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION 
ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MiNORITIES, REVISED AND UPDATED REPORT ON THE 
QUESTION OF THE PREVENTION AND PuNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE PREPARED BY MR. B. WHITAKER, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 at 10 n.l7 (1985). 
153. See SILENCING A PEOPLE, supra note 18, at Appendix A. Although the Genocide Convention requires 
only intent to destroy the group "in part," "most commentators assert that the number of individuals intended to 
be destroyed must be substantial, in light of the Convention's emphasis on acts against large numbers, rather than 
individuals." JASON S. ABRAMS AND STEVE R. RATNER, STRIVING FOR JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE 
CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE 39 (1995) (unpublished State Department Report on file with the Texas 
International Law Journal). 
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3. The Torture Convention. 
The Torture Convention entered into force on June 26, I 987 and currently has only 79 
parties. 154 The Convention defmes "torture" as: . 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person,· or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 155 
Many of the brutal atrocities committed by the Haitian military regime would fall 
within this definition. Perhaps the clearest example would be that of the ''political rapes'' 
of Aristide supporters and their relatives. In describing these abuses, the U.N./OAS Civilian 
Mission said: 
the scenario is always substantially the same. Armed men, often military or 
FRAPH members, burst into the house of a political activist they seek to capture. 
When he is not there and the family cannot say where he is, the intruders rape 
his wife, sister, daughter or cousin. 156 
These rapes would easily meet the definition of torture since they manifestly: (1) were 
committed by and with the acquiescence of persons acting in an official capacity; (2) were 
not incidental to lawful sanctions; (3) constituted acts by which severe pain or suffering is 
intentionally ihflicted; and (4) were committed with the purpose of punishing the family 
members of activists for their perceived opposition to the military regime or to intimidate 
or coerce such activists to abandon their support of Aristide. 
The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of torture are 
offenses under its intemallaw157 and establishes its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases 
where inter alia the alleged offender is a national of the state. 158 Several commentators 
have argued that the peculiar wording of the Torture Convention might allow for some types 
of amnesties, whereas the Genocide Convention contains a more airtight obligation to 
prosecute and punish. 159 The argument focuses on the fact that the Genocide Convention 
mandates that persons who commit genocide "shall be punished" 160 and requires states 
154. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened 
for signature Feb. 4, 1985,23 LL.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24J.L.M. 535 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 
1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. See Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 7 (reporting that as of December 31, 
1993, 19 states were party to the Convention). 
155. Torture Convention, supra note 154, art. I. 
156. 1\.11CIVIH Press Release, Ref. CP/94/20, May 19, 1994, reprinted in RAPE IN HAITI, supra note 17, at 
6. 
157. Torture Convention, supra note 154, art. 4. The Article also requires parties to criminalize acts which 
"constitute complicity or participation in torture." /d. 
158. /d. art. 5. 
159. See Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2604; Jose Zalaquett, C01ifronting Human Rights Violations Committed 
by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 79, at 42. 
160. Genocide Convention, supra note 144, art 4. 
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to ''provide effective penalties,'' 161 while the TortUTe Convention requires only that states 
"submit" cases involving allegations of torture to the "competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution" 162 and merely requires the state to make torture "punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature." 163 Thus, the Torture 
Convention, these commentators assert, "does not explicitly require that a prosecution take 
place, let alone that punishment be imposed and served.'' 164 
Such an argument misconstrues the nature of the prosecute or extradite formulation 
used in the Torture Convention, which is reproduced verbatim in several other modem 
international criminal conventions. 165 The TortUTe Convention was carefully worded to 
reflect the developments in international standards of due process that had occurred in the 
nearly forty years since the Genocide Convention was drafted in 1948. Of particular 
importance was the adoption in 1966 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which obligates states to ensUTe the rights of criminal defendants including ''the 
right to be presumed innocent" 166 and the right "to take proceedings before a court, in 
order that court may decide without delay·on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful." 167 To be consistent with these rights, the Torture 
Convention had to be worded in such a way as to avoid the suggestion of a predetermined 
outcome of the judicial proceedings and to recognize that there are legitimate reasons for 
the termination of an investigation or the dismissal of a case prior to triaL 163 
Nor should any significance be assigned to the slight difference in the wording of the 
two conventions' punishment clauses. The ma_nifest intent ofbot.h. conventions was to ensure 
that persons convicted of genocide or torture serve harsh sentences. In the view of the 
Torture Convention's drafters: "In applying article 4 (which requires states to make torture 
'punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature,') it seems 
reasonable to require that the punishment for torture should be close to the penalties applied 
to the most serious offenses under the domestic legal system." 169 Thus, this wording of 
the Torture Convention should not be construed to suggest the permissibility of amnesties 
or pardons. 
161. /d. art. 5. 
162. Torture Convention, supra note !54, art. 7(1). 
163. /d. art. 4(2). 
164. Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2604. 
165. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Sept 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 1975, J 015 U.N.T.S. 243; 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, !979, GA. Res. 34/J46, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th 
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. I 0, 1988, Int'l Maritime Doc. 
SUA/CON/15, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 672 (1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, Int'l Maritime Doc. SUA/CON/16, reprinted 
in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988). 
166. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9(4), 999 
U.N.T.S. 17i, i 76. 
167. /d. art. 14(2). The International Covenant has been adopted by over 100 states. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., 
iNTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 610 (1993). 
168. Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2604 n.306. 
169. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
129 (1988). 
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Unfortunately, Haiti is not a party to the Torture Convention; nor is it a party to the 
similarly worded Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 170 Still, some 
might argue that these conventions are relevantto the amnesty of the Haitian military regime 
based on the Committee Against Torture's 1990 decision concerning the Argentinean 
amnesty laws. In that case, the Committee Against Torture-a treaty body created by the 
Torture Convention to facilitate its implementation-decided that communications submitted 
by Argentinean citizens on behalf of their relatives who had been tortured by Argentinean 
military authorities were inadmissible since Argentina had ratified the Convention only after 
the amnesty laws had been enacted. However, in dictum, the Committee stated "even 
before the entry into force of the Convention against Torture, there existed a general rule 
of international law which should oblige all states to take effective measures to prevent 
torture and to punish acts oftorture." 171 
The Committee's statement should not be mistakenly construed as suggesting that 
amnesties for persons who commit torture are invalid under customary international law. 
By using the word "should," the Committee indicated that its statement was aspirational 
rather than a declaration of binding law. On the basis of its decision, the Committee urged 
Argentina to provide remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives; it did 
not suggest that international law required that Argentina do so. 172 Nor did it specifY that 
the remedy should be prosecution of those responsible, rather than some other appropriate 
remedy such as compensation. The Committee's decision, therefore, should not be read as 
indicating that states that are not parties to the Torture Convention such as Haiti are required 
to prosecute those who commit torture. 
B. General Human Rights Conventions 
Unlike the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the Torture Convention, 
the general human rights conventions to which Haiti is a party (such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 173 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights174) are silent about a duty to punish violations of the rights they were designed to 
protect. These general human rights conventions do, however, obligate states to "ensure" 
the rights enumerated therein. Some commentators take the position that the duty to ensure 
rights implies a duty to prosecute violators. 175 
170. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, 67 O.A.S.T.S., reprinted in 25 
I.L.M. 519 (1986). Article 8 of the Convention provides that "[i]fthere is an accusation or well-grounded reason 
to believe that an act of torture has been committed within their jurisdiction, the States Parties shall guarantee that 
their respective authorities will proceed ex officio and immediately to conduct an investigation into the case and 
to initiate, whenever appropriate, the corresponding criminal process." 
171. Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex V, at 109-13, 
U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990). 
172. /d. 
173. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
174. American Convention on Human Rights, Jan. 7, 1970, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 
65 rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 91.L.M. 673 (1970). Haiti ratified the American Convention on September 
14, 1977 by a declaration signed by Jean-claude Duvalier. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: Searching for Alternatives, 
in IMPUNITY, supra note 11, at 362 n.75. 
175. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 467; Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2568; Thomas Buergenthal, To 
Respect and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
72, 77 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) ("obligation to 'ensure' rights creates affirmative obligations on the state-for 
example, to discipline its officials."). 
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To support their position, the commentators point to the ''authoritative interpretations'' 
rendered by the Human Rights Committee, which was established to monitor compliance 
with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 176 The Committee is empowered to 
comment on communications received from individuals who are from states that have 
ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant and who claim to have suffered a violation 
of any of the rights protected by the Covenant.177 Three communications issued by the 
Committee have been cited as particularly noteworthy. First, in response to a communica-
tion alleging acts of torture in Zaire, the Committee issued a comment stating that Zaire was 
"under a duty to ... conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the victim's] torture, to 
punish those found guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not 
occur in the future." 178 Second, in response to a communication alleging extralegal 
executions in Suriname, the Committee urged the government ''to take effective steps (i) 
to investigate the killings ... [and] (ii) to bring to justice any persons found to be responsi-
ble.'' 179 And fmally, in a case involving disappearances (fo~ced abductions by state agents 
followed by denials of knowledge of the victim's whereabouts) in Uruguay, the Committee 
concluded that the government of Uruguay should take "immediate and effective 
steps ... to bring to justice any persons found to be respopsible for [the victim's] 
disappearance.'' 180 
In addition, the Human Rights Committee periodically elaborates on the obligations of 
states pursuant to specific articles of the Covenant through issuance of the Committee's 
"General Comments." 181 In 1992, the Committee issued a Comment asserting that 
amnesties covering acts of torture "are generaiiy incompatible with the duty of States to 
investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to 
ensure that they do not occur in the future." 182 
The authoritative interpretation rationale is based on the notion that parties to the 
Covenant, having undertaken the treaty obligations contained therein, are subsequently bound 
to accept, for the purposes of interpreting these obligations, the interpretations rendered by 
the Human Rights Committee. 183 This rationale is, however, somewhat of an overstretch. 
The Human Rights Committee is not a judicial body authorized to render authoritative 
interpretations of the Covenant but is rather an administrative body established to monitor 
compliance with the treaty. Moreover, during the negotiations of the Covenant, the 
delegates specifically considered and rejected a proposal that would have required states to 
prosecute violators. 184 Consequently, to read in such a requirement on the basis of the 
Human Rights Committee's comments would be inconsistent with the understanding of the 
Conventions' drafters, upon which the majority of parties relied when ratifying the 
176. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2568; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International Treaties of 
an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute, and Provide Redress, in IMPUNITY, supra note II, at 28-30. 
177. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (1966), 
reprinted in II UNITED NATIONS REsOLUTIONS 175 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1975). 
178. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annexxm, ~ 13, at 188, 
U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984). 
179. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex~.~ 16, at 194, 
U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985). 
180. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XXII,~ 16, at 
224, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983). 
I 81. Orentlicher, supra note 64, at 464 n.20. 
182. UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS, ADDENDUM, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C21/Rev.l/Add.3 at 4 (1992). 
183. Cf SIMMA, supra note 12, at 223. 
184. U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 6th Sess., Supp. No. 5, ~ 24, at 5, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/SR.J95 
(1950). 
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Convention. Nevertheless, an increasing number of commentators, as well as the state-
parties themselves, seem to consider the Committee's General Comments as Covenant 
jurisprudence. 185 Arguably, countries that have more recently ratified the Covenant enter 
the system with full knowledge of this jurisprudence and an awareness that the Cold War 
· context of the legislative history is increasingly obsolete. 
·Although the Human Rights Committee's pronouncements suggest a duty for the State 
to do something to give meaning to the rights enumerated in the Covenant, a careful reading 
of the Committee's comments reveals that the Committee never actually concluded that there 
was an obligation to prosecute· attendant to the duty to ensure the rights provided in the 
Covenant. Rather, the Committee ''urged" Suriname to prosecute and said that Uruguay 
"should" bring violators to ju5tice. 186 Nor did the Committee state that Zaire had to 
undertake criminal prosecutions but only that it had a duty to punish those found guilty by 
an inquiry. Thereby, the Committee left the door open to alternative measures, including 
dismissing the perp'etratorfrom the military, canceling his government pension, banning him 
from public office, and/or requiring him to pay damages through administrative fmes or civil 
proceedings. The Committee's 1992 General Comment is consistent with this interpretation. 
By stating that amnesties "are generally incompatible," the Committee implied that some 
amnesties-for example, those (as in Haiti) that are accompanied by investigations to 
document abuses and identifY perpetrators, purging them from positions of authority, and 
providing victim compensation-would be acceptable. 
The authoritative iriterpretation rationale has more \veight as applied to the decisions 
rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreting the American 
Convention on Human Rights. Commentators who argue that a duty to prosecute violators 
must be read into the American Convention have pointed to the Court's "landmark 
decision"· in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case181 to support their position. 188 That case 
concerned the unresolved disappearance of Manfredo Velasquez in September 1981. The 
Court heard testimony indicating that he had been tortured and killed by Honduran security 
forces. Writing of the duty under Article 1(1) of the American Convention to "ensure" 
rights set forth in the Convention, the Court stated: 
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full 
enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States must 
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the 
Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and 
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation. 189 
The Court then proceeded to find the Honduran government to be in breach of its duties 
under the Convention and ordered it to pay compensation to the victim's relatives. 190 
One must be careful, however, not to read too much into the Velasquez Rodriguez Case 
with respect to the duty to prosecute violations of the American Convention. In particular, 
it is important to note that the Court, in ordering remedies, did not direct the Honduran 
government to institute criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance 
185. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note II, at 28-30. 
186. See supra note 180. 
187. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 95 IL.R 232, 297 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1988). 
188. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 64, at 429. 
189. Veltisquez Rodriguez, 95 l.L.R. at 295. 
190. /d. at 301. 
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of Manfredo Velasquez, noh,vithstanding the fact that the lavvyers for the victims' families 
and the Inter-American Commission had specifically requested such injui1Ctive relief. 191 
Indeed, although the Court said that "States must prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention,'' it did not specifically refer to 
criminal prosecution as opposed to other forms of disciplinary action or punishment. 
In the wake of the 1989 Velasquez judgment of the Inter-American Court, the Inter-
Atuerican Com.inission revisited the question of the permissibility of amnesty laws in cases 
concerning El Salvador, Uraguay, and Argentina. 192 In all three cases, the Commission 
determined that the amnesties were incompatible with the American Convention's right to 
a remedy (Article 25) and right to judicial proce~s (Article 8), read together with Article 1 's 
obligation to ensure rights. 193 These cases are, however, distinguishable from the Haiti 
situation in that the amnesties affected the domestic law right to initiate or participate in the 
public criminal process as well as civil redress, which was closely connected with criminal 
prosecution. 194 The Amnest'j Law, in contrast, allows for private suits against members 
of the military regime. 195 While an unqualified amnesty of persons who violated the rights 
contained in the American Convention is not likely to pass the Inter-American Court's 
muster, it is not at all clear that the Inter-American Court would fni.d fault with the Haitian 
response to the abuses of the military regime that combines a truth commission, purges of 
officers from the military, limited prosecutions, and a program of victim compensation and 
civil redress. 196 
C. Customary International Law: Crimes Against Humanity 
In 1988, the Aspen Institute and the Ford Foundation sponsored a conference on "State 
Crimes: Punishment or Pardon," which brought together some of the leading academic and 
governmental experts on the issue of the responsibility of states to prosecute the gross 
violations of human rights committed by prior regimes. 197 The Conference participants 
reached consensus that there was no duty under customary international law to prosecute 
such violators and that such a duty existed only where there was a relevant treaty 
obligation. 193 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Conference participants concen-
trated on general human rights violations and failed to consider whether crimes against 
humanity under customary international law might uniquely cany with them the obligation 
to prosecute in the absence of a controlling treaty. Several commentators have subsequently 
taken the position that there is, in fact, a duty under customary international iaw to prosecute 
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and that the granting of amnesty to those who 
commit such c1imes is a violation of international law. 199 The following section of this 
Article examines the contemporary definition of crimes against humanity, analyzes whether 
191. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note ll, at 31. 
192. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 26/92 (El Salvador), 82nd Sess., OEA/ser. 
UV/II.82 (1992); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 29/92 (Uruguay), 82nd Sess., 
OEA/ser. UV /11.82, Doc. 25 (1992); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 24/92 (Argentina), 
82nd Sess., OEA/ser. UV/II.32, Doc. 24 (1992). 
193. Jd. 
194. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, Statutes of 
Limitations, and Superior "Orders, in IMPUNITY, supra note 11, at 62. 
195. One by One, supra note 118. 
196. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text 
197. Henkin, supra note 88, at l. 
!98. Jd. at 4. 
199. See Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 15; Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2585, 2593; BASSIOUNl, supra note 
73, at 492, 500-01. 
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the Haitian abuses would meet this defmition, and explores whether there is, in fact, a duty 
under customary international law to prosecute such crimes. 
1. The Historical Development of Crimes Against Humanity 
The term ''crimes against humanity'' as the label for a category of international crimes 
recognized under customary international law originated in the joint declaration of the 
governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia of May 28, 1915, denouncirigthe Turkish 
massacre of over a million Armenians in Turkey as constituting ''crimes against civilization 
and humanity'' for which the members of the Turkish Government would be held 
responsible.200 The Charter of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was the first 
international instrument in which crimes against humanity were codified.201 The basis for 
the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter included the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions; experiences and practices in the aftermath of World War I, and 
the Allied declarations during World War II. In addressing the defense claim of ex post 
facto law, the Nuremberg Tribunal concluded: 
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious 
nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of 
international law existing at the time of its creation and to that extent is itself a 
contribution to intemationallaw.202 
The Nuremberg Charter defmed crimes against humanity as follows: 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [i.e., war crimes 
or crimes against peace], whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated.203 
Under the Nuremberg Charter, the only difference between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity was that the former were acts committed against nationals of another state, while 
the latter were acts committed against nationals of the same state as that of the perpetra-
tors.204 Both, moreover, had to be committed in connection with the war.205 While the 
Nuremberg Tribunal ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over acts of persecution against 
German Jews committed before the beginning of the war in 1939, the judgment left unclear 
whether the Tribunal believed the linkage to war to be required by international law or 
200. BASSIOUNI, supra note 73, at 168. 
201. ld. at 2. 
202. 22TruAL OF TilE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 461 (1949), 
quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 73, at 120. 
203. Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to· the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed at London, August 1945, 59 Stat 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force August 8, 1945), as amended by the Berlin Protocol of 6 October 1995, 
reproduced in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 675-85 (1995) (hereinafter 2 MORRIS & SCHARF). 
204. See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BruT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 206 (1946). 
205. ld. 
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merely by its charter.206 The answer to that question is critical to our inquiry concerning 
the Haiti situation since, as discussed above, the atrocities in Haiti were not committed 
during war. 
Although at least one commentator has concluded that ''the post-Nuremberg develop-
ments have failed decisively to resolve the nexus issue," 207 a cursory survey of these 
developments should remove any doubt that the concept of crimes against humanity under 
customary international law now extends to atrocities committed during peacetime. First, 
the linkage to war was not included in the definition of crimes against humanity contained 
in Control Council Law No. 10, which was adopted after the Nuremberg Charter to provide 
a uniform basis for the trial of German war criminals other than the major war criminals 
hied by the Nuremberg Tribunal.202 Second, in its authoritative report on the development 
of the laws of war at the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials and Control Council Law No. 
10 trials, the U.N. War Cri..mes Commission concluded that international law may now 
sanction individuals for cri..mes agai.nst hu..ma..nity committed not only during war but also 
during peacetime.209 Third, in the International Law Commission's [ILC) formulation of 
the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, the Commission indicated that crimes against humanity 
of the inhuman-act type could be committed apart from war, while it retained the restriction 
for crimes against humanity of the persecution type.210 Fourth, the 1968 Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Certain War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity provides in .Article I that such limitations do not apply to '' [ c ]rimes against 
humanity whether conm1itted in time of vtar or in time of peace. " 21 1 Finaily, the 
206. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. 1. lNT'L L. 172, 248 
(1947). 
207. Orentlicher, supra note I, at 2590. 
208. See BASSIOUN1, supra note 73, at 35. The jurisprudence of the trials under Control Council Law No. 
10, however, was mixed on whether crimes against humanity could be committed during peacetime. In the 
Eisatzgruppen Case and the Justice Case, the courts recognized that crimes against humanity were not limited to 
atrocities committed during a war. In the Flick Case and Ministries Case, the courts followed the precedent of the 
International Military Tribunal and required the connection to war notwithstanding the differences in the Nuremberg 
Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. See I Moruus & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 75 n.242, 76 n.243. 
209. According to the United Nations War Crimes Commission: 
[There exists] a system of international law under which individuals are responsible to the community 
of nations for violations of rules of international criminal law, and according to which attacks on the 
fundamental liberties and constitutional rights of people and individual persons, that is inhuman acts, 
constitute international crimes not only in time of war, but also, in certain circumstances, in time of 
peace. 
HlSTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 
COMPILED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (1948), reproduced in BASSIOUNI, supra note 73, 
at 570. 
210. The ILC is a group of 34 distinguished international legal experts elected by the United Nations General 
Assembly with a mandate to encourage ''the progressive development of international law and its codification.'' 
See NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND TRADE, 1992 UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 25 
(1992). In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly directed the ILC to "formulate the principles of international law 
recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal." !d. In 1950, the ILC 
adopted and submitted the Nuremberg Principles to the General Assembly. These included the following 
formulation on crimes against humanity: "Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts 
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are 
done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war 
crime." BASSIOUN1, supra note 73, at 480 (emphasis added). 
211. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Certain War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. II, 1970). This Convention, however, has 
not been widely ratified. It is not in itself strong evidence of customary international law. 
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Secretary-General's Report on the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal-which was prepared 
by the United Nations Office of Legal Counsel on the basis of rules that were considered 
to be "beyond doubt customary international law"-stated that international law now 
prohibits crimes against humanity "regardless of whether they are committed in an armed 
conflict.' ' 212 This statement was confirmed by the frrst decision of the Appeals Chamber 
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The Tribunal found "[t]he obscolescence of the nexus 
requirement is evidenced byinternationalconventionsregardinggenocideand apartheid, both 
of which prohibit particular types of crimes against humanity regardless of any connection 
to armed conflict."213 . 
2. Were the Haitian Abuses Crimes Against Humanity? 
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda/14 which constitutes 
the most recent international codification of crimes against humanity, defmes such crimes 
in Article 3. This Article states: 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation; 
(e) Imprisonment; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape; 
(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) Other inhumane acts.215 
212. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (1993), reproduced in 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 12. The submission of the Commission 
of Experts established by Security Council Resolution 780, as well as the submissions of other organizations and 
States, expressed the view that the Yugoslavia Statute should define crimes against humanity irrespective of armed 
conflict No state or organization took the position that crimes against humanity under international Jaw could only 
be committed during war. 1 MORRlS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 82 n.262. The actual statute, however, provides 
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only "when committed in armed conflict .... " 
I d. at 82. This restriction was a result of the context in which the Yugoslavia Tribunal was created, rather than 
a reflection of a rule of customary international Jaw. /d. at 83-84. 
213. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, U.N. International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Oct. 2, 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72. 
214. The Rwanda Tribunal was created by the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, in response to continuing reports of "genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations 
of international humanitarian Jaw committed in Rwanda .... " See S.C. Res. 955, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
215. See id. at 4. This definition departs slightly from that contained in the Statute of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal. It replaces the phrase "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, 
and directed against any civilian population" found in the article on crimes against humanity in the Statute of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal with the phrase, "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 321 
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This defmition of crimes against humanity contains four general criteria. These criteria 
include that the acts must be: (1) inhumane in character;216 (2) widespread or systemat-
ic;217 (3) directed against a civilian population; and (4) committed on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds.218 
The first of these criteria distinguishes crimes against humanity from lawful acts (e.g., 
imprisonment or deportation) done pursuant to a valid judicial or administrative decision 
following a full and fair hearing. The second criterion requires that the inhumane acts be 
widespread or systematic rather than isolated inhumane acts or random acts of violence. The 
third criterion indicates that crimes against humanity are restricted to inhumane acts · 
committed against civilians as distinguished from members of the armed forces. The fourth 
criterion, which includes acts committed on political grounds, highlights a critical difference 
between crimes against humanity under customary international law and the crime of 
genocide which the Genocide Convention defmes to exclude acts directed against ''political 
groups.' •219 
The customary practice of states, evidenced in international and military prosecutions, 
allows for fairly concise definitions of crimes against humanity when the four aforemen-
tioned criteria are met.220 Pursuant to such defmitions, the atrocities committed by the 
Haitian military regime would unquestionably meet the first and third criteria for crimes 
against humanity. Numerous "inhumane acts" of murder, extermination, imprisonment, 
torture, rape, persecution, and mutilation committed against Civilians have been documented 
by international observer missions.221 Moreover, these acts clearly reflected state action 
I.L.M. 1163, 1173 (1993). 
216. This is indicated by the phrase "other inhumane acts." The canon of construction known as ejusdem 
generis suggests that the listed crimes proceeding "other inhumane acts" must be construed to be limited to things 
of the same kind. The crimes listed include all of the inhumane acts enumerated in the Nuremberg defmition, with 
the addition of three inhumane acts that were expressly recognized as being of such gravity as to qualify as crimes 
against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, namely imprisonment, torture, and rape. See BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 73, at 35. 
217. Although the phrase "widespread or systematic" does not appear in the Nuremberg Charter, it is 
synonymous with the phrase "committed against any civilian population" as used in the Nuremberg definition. 
See Schwelb, supra note 204, at 191 (concluding that. the phrase any civilian population "indicates that a larger 
body of victims is visualized and that single or isolated acts committed against individuals are outside its scope."). 
218. The requirement that the attack must be on "political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds" is drawn from 
the Nuremberg Charter's reference to "persecutions." This requirement was not included in the Statute of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal, and an argument can be made that it unnecessarily blurs the distinction between the two 
different types of crimes against humanity recognized at Nuremberg, namely inhumane act-type crimes and 
persecution-type crimes. On the other hand, the drafters may have meant for this requirement to merely clarify 
that crimes against humanity are restricted to acts committed as part of state action or policy. See BASSIOUNI, 
supra note 73, at 248-50. 
219. See id. 
220. "Murder" is "intentional killing without lawful justification," and includes killings done by knowingly 
.creating conditions likely to cause death. BASSIOUNI, supra note 73, at 29G-91. "Extermination" is murder on 
a large scale. /d. at 291. "Enslavement" is the exercise of powers "attaching to a right of ownership over a 
person," including such practices as "debt bondage, serfdom, slave labor, and the exploitation of children." /d. 
at 299-300. "Deportation" is the "forced removal of people from one country to another." /d. at 301. 
"Persecution" is the "infliction upon individuals of harassment, torture, oppression, or discriminatory measures, 
designed to or likely to produce physical or mental suffering or economic harm, because of the victim's beliefs, 
views, or membership in a given political, racial or religious group." /d. at 317. "Imprisonment" refers to 
unlawful incarceration. "Rape" would include forcible sexual intercourse and other serious assaults of a sexual 
nature. ''Other inhumane acts,'' although an exact definition does not exist, would include such acts as unlawful 
human experimentation and torture. /d. at 321-22, 327. All of the aforementioned acts do not necessarily 
constitute crimes against humanity per se. For acts such as rape, imprisonment, and torture to be internationally 
cognizable, they must be "the product of state action or policy." /d. at 327. 
221. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. 
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or policy and were committed on political grounds as required by the fourth criterion. As 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
It was nearly four years ago that a military coup transfonned Haiti's newborn 
democracy into a nightmare of repression .... Murder, mutilation, rape, and the 
kidnapping of children were not just officially sanctioned-often officially 
perpetrated--crimes; they were instruments of rule. They became common tools 
for dealing with citizens and families suspected of supporting democracy.222 
Whether these acts met the "widespread and systematic" requirement of the second 
criterion is a slightly more difficult call. Certainly, the abuses committed by the Haitian 
military regime were more than isolated crimes or random acts of violence. In authorizing 
the invasion of Haiti by a multinational force, the Security Council noted that the acts of the 
military regime had amounted to "systematic violations,"223 and President Clinton told 
Congress that the abuses threatened ''tens of thousands of Haitians.' '224 Yet the scale of 
the Haitian abuses pales in comparison to the numbers of atrocities committed in Rwanda 
(where over 500,000 Tutsis were killed), Bosnia (where over 200,000 Muslims were killed 
and 20,000 were raped), or Nazi Gennany (where over six million Jews were exterminated). 
However, international law has never sought to quantify the minimum number of casualties 
or the minimum percentage of the total population affected necessary to constitute a crime 
against humanity. Rather, since Nuremberg, the test has been both quantitative and qualita- . 
tive-na.me!y whether the offense passes ''in magnitude or savagery any limits of what is 
tolerable by modem civilization. " 225 The Haiti situation would seem to meet this 
admittedly subjective standard, which is somewhat like the "I know it when I see it" test 
for obscenity articulated by Justice Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court.226 
The persons criminally liable for such crimes against humanity in Haiti would include 
both the individual perpetrators as well as their civilian or military superiors under the 
theory of'' command responsibility.'' Indeed, international law perceives those in command 
as bearing greater responsibility for atrocities than those who carry them out and does not 
condone trials of lower level "scapegoats" as an alternative for going after the "big-
wigs.••227 
''Command responsibility'' encompasses two distinct forms of criminal responsibility. 
First, a commander may be directly responsible for his own unlawful orders.228 Second, 
there may be imputed criminal responsibility for unlawful conduct which is not based on the 
commander's orders, but rather on the commander's failure to act to: (1) prevent an 
222. Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(Mar. 9, 1995), reprinted in Promoting Democracy and Economic Growth in Haiti, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 
13, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
223. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 45. 
224. Letter from President Clinton, supra note 4. 
225. Schwelb, supra note 204, at 195 (quoting Justice Jackson's opening speech at Nuremberg) (emphasis 
added). 
226. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
227. Orentlicher, supra note 64, at 437; Press Statement by Justice Richard Goldstone, Prosecutor, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Conjunction with the Announcement oflndictments 
(July 25, 1995), on file with the Texas International Law Journal (describing strategy of targeting top leaders for 
prosecution). 
228. See BASSIOUNJ, supra note 73, at 368. 
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unlawful act that he knew or had reason to know his subordinate was about to commit;229 
(2) stop a subordinate engaged in unlawful conduct of which the commander was aware; (3) 
promote for general measures likely to halt or discourage unlawful conduct; (4) investigate 
allegations of illegal acts; or (5) prosecute, and upon conviction, punish those committing 
the illegal acts.230 
Under this standard, the leaders of the Haitian military regime-Raoul Cedras and 
Philippe Biamby-were unquestionably responsible for the crimes against humanity 
committed by the members of the armed forces and Haitian police under their com-
mand.231 Moreover, precedenU]:om the trial QfJapanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita 
following World War II suggests that it is not a defense that these Haitian leaders did not 
order or were unaware of the atrocities committed by the Haitian military or police forces. 
Rather, under international law, it is enough to establish liability that military and civilian 
leaders condoned an atmosphere of lawlessness that pervaded the troops under their 
command.232 The imposition of such liability in Haiti is problematic, however. Although . 
the Haitian military had a clear-cut command structure, the ambivalent hierarchy of authority 
between the section chiefs, the attaches, and FRAPH complicates efforts to hold military 
leaders accountable based solely on their command responsibilities.233 
3. Is There a Duty to Prosecute Crimes Against Humanity? 
Traditimially, those who committed crimes against humanity were treated, like pirates, 
as hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind).234 Domestic courts of all nations 
could punish such persons. 235 In the absence of a treaty containing the aut dedere aut 
judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle, this policy of so-called ''universal jurisdiction'' 
is generally thought to be permissive, not mandatory. As noted above, however, several 
commentators have recently taken the position that customary international law not only 
establishes permissive jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against humanity but also 
229. The Commission ofExperts, established pursuimtto Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate 
the atrocities committed in the fanner Yugoslavia, fonnulated the following indices to detennine whether or not 
a commander must have known about the acts of his subordinates: 
(a) the number of illegal acts; (b) the type of illegal acts; (c) the scope of illegal acts; (d) the time 
during which the illegal acts occurred; (e) the number and type of troops involved; (f) the logistics 
involved, if any; (g) the geographical location of the acts; (h) the widespread occurrence of the acts; 
(i) the tactical tempo of operations; G) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; (k) the officers and 
staff involved; (I) the location of the commander at the time. 
UNJTED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LEITER DATED 24 MAY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 at 17 (1994). 
230. See BASSIOUNJ, supra note 73, at 368. 
231. Although Article 263 of the Haitian Constitution requires the separation of the police from the military, 
from 1991 to 1994, the police remained under the direct control of the army. Stotzk-y, supra note 34, at 362 n.77. 
232. General Yamashita had been the commanding general of the Japanese forces and the military governor 
of the Philippines. He was charged with the murder and mistreatment of over 32,000 Filipino civilians and 
captured Americans and the rape of hundreds of Filipino women committed by the Japanese forces. The 
prosecution did not attempt to prove that General Yamashita ordered the atrocities or even that he had direct 
knowledge of them. Rather, it sought to show the atrocities were so widespread that he "must have known" of 
them and yet he took no action to stop them. The military commission presiding over Yamashita's trial acCepted 
this argument and sentenced him to death on the basis of his failure "to provide effective control of [his] troops 
as was required by the circumstances." BASSIOUNJ, supra note 73, at 380. 
233. Stotzky, supra note 34, at 197. 
234. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 176, at 25. 
235. Jd. 
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requires their prosecution and conversely prohibits the granting of amnesty to such 
persons.236 
In addition to the policy rationales discussed above, there are strong jurisprudential 
reasons for recognizing such a rule. The perpetrator of crimes against humanity incurs 
criminal responsibility and is subject to punishment as a direct consequence of international 
law, notwithstanding the national laws of any state or states to the contrary. This unique 
characteristicof crime.s under international law makes it questionable whether any state or 
group of states would be competent to negate this responsibility. Moreover, the notion of 
granting amnesty for crimes against humanity would be inconsistent with the principles of 
individual criminal responsibility recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment. The 
fundamental purpose of these principles is to remove any possibility of immunity for persons 
responsible for such crimes, from the most junior officer acting under the orders of his 
superior to the most senior government officials, including the head of state.237 
Customary futemationallaw, which is just as binding upon states as treaty law,238 
arises from "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation," referred to as opinio juris. 239 Under traditional notions of customary 
international law, "deeds were what counted, not just words."240 Yet, those who argue 
that customary international law precludes amnesty for crimes against humanity base their 
position on non-binding241 General Assembly resolutions/42 authoritative declarations 
236. See Edelenbi:>s, supra note 39, at 15; Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2585, 2593; BASSIOUNJ, supra note 
73, at 491, 500-01. 
237. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 53, at 112-13. 
238. While customarY international law is binding on states internationally, not all states accord customary 
international law equal domestic effect A growing number of states' constitutions automatically incorporate 
customary international law as part of the law of the land and even accord it a ranking higher than domestic 
statutes. See SIMMA, supra ·note 12, at 213. In the United States, customary international law is deemed 
incorporated into the common law of the United States. It is considered controlling, however, only where there 
is no contradictory treaty, statute, or executive act. See. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that Attorney General's decision to detain Marie! Cuban refugees indefinitely without a hearing trumped 
any contrary rules of customary international law). For a criticism of the analysis in Garcia-Mir, see Jordan J. 
Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for the United States, 34 VA. J. lNT'L L. 981, 989 
(1994). 
239. REsTATEMENT ('IHrRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 1 02(2) (1987); Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, art. 38{l)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945) (sources of international law applied by the Court include 
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."). 
240. SIMMA, supra note 12, at 216. 
241. See0scarSchacter,IntemationalLawin1heoryandPractice, 178R.C.A.D.I. 111-21 (1982). "[U]nder 
the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly does not have the legal power to make law or to adopt binding 
decisions except for certain organizational matters (such as procedural rules, regulations for the Secretariat and 
subsidiary bodies and financial decisions)." Id at 111. 
242. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
81, U.N. Doc. N6716 (1967) ("The right to seek and to enjoy asylum may not be invoked hy any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a . . . crime against 
humanity .... "); G.A. Res. 2712, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 78-79, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970) 
(condemning crimes against humanity and calling upon the States concerned to bring to trial persons guilty of such 
crimes); G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. N8429 (1971); Principles of 
International Co-operation in 'the Detection, Arrest, Exlradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity; G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc. 
NRES/3074 (1973) (adopted by a vote of94 in favor to none against with 29 abstentions) (crimes against humanity 
"shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed such 
crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trials and, if found guilty, to punishment"); Principles on the Effective 
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, annexed to UNITED NATIONS, 
EcONOMJC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REsOLUTION 1989/65: EFFECTIVE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION OF EXTRA-
LEGAL, ARBITRARY AND SUMMARY ExEcUTIONS (1989) (states shall bring to justice those accused of having 
participated in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
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of international conferences,243 and international conventions that are not widely rati· 
fied, 244 rather than on any extensive state practice consistent with such a rule. 
To the extent any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the practice of grantin! 
amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity. Indeed, n1 
sooner had the term "crimes against humanity" been first coined with respect to th, 
massacres of Armenians during World War I, than the international community agreed t< 
an amnesty for the Turkish perpetrators.245 Prosecution was also forsaken after tb1 
Algerian war, when, pursuant to the Evian Agreement of 1962, France and Algeria decide, 
against trying persons who bad committed atrocities.'" Similarly, after the Bang1adesl 
war of 1971, India and Bangladesh consented not to prosecute Pakistani charged wit] 
genocide and crimes against humanity in exchange for political recognition of Bang1adesl 
by Pakistan.247 More recently, governments in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatema], 
I 
Enforced Disappearances, GA. Res. 47/133~ inUNITFD NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE, Rf.SOUJT10NS AND DECISION 
ADOPTFD BY THE GENERAL AssEMBLY DURJNG THE FIRST PART OF ITS FORTY~SEVENTII SESSION, U.N. Do1 
GA/8470 (1992) (equating disa.ppenrnnces to a crime against humanity ahd requiring states to try any perso 
suspected of having perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance). 
Commentators often cite the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra, at 81, as the earliest internation; 
recognition of a legal obligntion to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration providf 
that "stntes shall not gront asylum to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considerin 
that he has committed a ... crime against humanity.'' Jd. Yet according to the historic record of this resolutio, 
The majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under consideration was not intended to 
propound legal norms or to change existing rules of international law, but to lay down broad 
humanitarian and moral principles upon which States might rely in seeking to unifY their practices 
relating to asylum. 
1967 U.N.Y.B. 759. This evidences that, from th_e onset, the Genem1 Assembly envisioned its role as adviso1 
rather than legislative with regard to delineating a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity. 
243. The fiital Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights affrm 
that "[s]tntes should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grnve violations of humr 
rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the rule oflnw." UNITE 
NATIONS, WORLD- CONFERENCE ON HUI<..iAN R.lGHTS, DECLARATION AND PROGRAI\.fl\.fE OF AcnON, U.N. Do 
NConfll57f23 (1993). 
244. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Again 
Humanity, supra note 211 (no statutory limitation shall apply to crimes against humanity, irrespective of the da 
of their commission). As of December 31, 1994, the Convention had been ratified by just 39 states, which did n 
include Haiti. See UNITED NATONS, MULTn.ArntAL TREATIES DEPOSJTED WJTH 11-IE SECRETARY-GENERAl 
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1994, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13 all 56-57 (1995). So few states have ratifi1 
the Convention because of its inclusion of apartheid as a crime against humanity. Orenllicher, supra note I, 
2591 n240. The Convention's provisions relating to crimes against humanity were so controversial that anoth 
Convention on the same subject was later drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Jd The Europe: 
Cmivention on the Non~ Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and Wnr Crimes, open, 
for signature Jan. 25, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.LM. 540 (1974), applies only to crimes committed after the ent 
into force of the Convention and omits apartheid from its definition of crimes against humanity. 
245. See Schwclb, supra note 204, at 182. Initially, the Allied Powers sought the prosecution of tho 
responsible for the mnsSocrCs. The Treaty ofSevr'es, which was signed on August I 0, 1920, would have requir-
the Turkish Government to hand over those responsible to the Allied Powers for trial. Treaty of Peace bctwe 
the Allied Powers and Turkey (freaty ofSevres), Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 192 
The Treaty of Sevres was, however, not ratified and did not come into force. II was replaced by the Treaty 
Lausanne, which not only did not contain provisions respecting the punishment of war crimes, but was accompnni 
by a "Declaration of Amnesty" of all offenses committed between 1914 and 1921. Treaty of Peace between t 
AHied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne), July 24, 1923, reprinted in 18 A.l\..1. J. INT'L L. J (Supp. 192· 
246. Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 13. 
247. BASSIOUNl, supra note 73, at 22&-30. During the war over Bangladesh's independence, West Pakist 
troops killed approximately one million East Pakistanis who supported efforts to establish the independent nati 
of Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh initially agreed to bring charges of genocide and crimes against human 
ngninst 195 of the 10,000 Pakistani troops who had been captured by India. Pakistan concurrently filed a c: 
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of ii1ternational conferences,243 and international conventions that are not widely ratj. 
fied/44 rather than on any extensive state practice consistent with such a rule. 
To the extent any state practice i.-1 this area is widespread, it is the practice of grantin1 
amnesties or de facto inlpunity to those who commit crimes against humanity. Indeed, n< 
sooner had the term "crimes against humanity" been first coined with respect to th1 
massacres of Armenians during World War I, than the international community agreed t< 
an amnesty for the Turkish perpetrators. 245 Prosecution was also forsaken after th1 
Algerian war, when, pursuant to the Evian Agreement of 1962, France and Algeria decide, 
against trying persons who had committed atrocities.246 Similarly, after the Bangladesl 
war of 1971, India and Bangladesh consented not to prosecute Pakistani charged wit! 
genocide and crimes against humanity in exchange for political recognition of Bangladesl 
by Pakistan.247 More recently, governments in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, GuatemalE 
Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/l33; in UNITED NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE, REsOLUTIONS AND DECISION 
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURlNG THE FIRST PART OF ITS FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION, U.N. Do1 
GA/8470 (1992) (equating disappearances to a crime against humanity and requiring states to try any perso 
suspected of having perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance). 
Commentators often cite the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra, at 81, as the earliest intemation: 
recognition of a legal obligation to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provide 
that "states shall not grant asylum to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considerin 
Lhat he has committed a ... crime against humanity." !d. Yet according to the historic record of this resolutim 
The majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under consideration was not intended io 
propound legal norms or to change existing rules of international law, but to lay down broad 
humanitarian and moral principles upon which States might rely in seeking to unify their practices 
relating to asylum. 
!967 U.N.Y.B. 759. This evidences that, from the onset, the General Assembly envisioned its role as advism 
rather than legislative with regard to delineating a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity. 
243. The final Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights affim 
that "[s]tates should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of hum< 
rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing a finn basis for the rule of Jaw.'' UNITE 
NATIONS, WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, U.N. Do 
A/Confll57/23 (1993). 
244. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Again 
Humanity, supra note 211 (no statutory limitation shall apply to crimes against humanity, irrespective of the da 
of their commission). As of December 3 !, ! 994, Lhe Convention had been ratified by just 39 states, which did n 
include Haiti. See UNITED NATONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAl 
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1994, U.N. Doc. ST!LEG/SERE!l3 at 156-57 (1995). So few states have ratifit 
the Convention because of its inclusion of apartheid as a crime against humanity. Orentlicher, supra note 1, 
2591 n.240. The Convention's provisions relating to crimes against humanity were so controversial that anoth 
Convention on the same subject was later drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe. I d. The Europe: 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, open. 
for signature Jan. 25, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974), applies only to crimes committed after the ent 
into force of the Convention and omits apartheid from its definition of crimes against humanity. 
245. See Schwelb, supra note 204, at 182. Initially, the Allied Powers sought the prosecution of tho 
responsible for the massacres. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 1 0, 1920, would have requir· 
the Turkish Government to hand over those responsible to the Allied Powers for trial. Treaty of Peace betwe 
the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sevres), Aug. I 0, 1920, reprinted in I 5 AM. J. INT'L L. I 79 (Supp. 192 
The Treaty of Sevres was, however, not ratified and did not come into force. It was replaced by the Treaty 
Lausanne, which not only did not contain provisions respecting the punishment of war crimes, but was accompani 
by a "Declaration of Amnesty" of all offenses committed between I 914 and 1922. Treaty of Peace between I 
Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne), July 24, 1923, reprinted in 18 Alvl. J. iNT'L L. i (Supp. 192· 
246. Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 13. 
247. BASSIOUNI, supra note 73, at 228-30. During the war over Bangladesh's independence, West Palcist 
troops killed approximately one million East Pakistanis who supported efforts to establish the independent nati 
of Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh initially agreed to bring charges of genocide and crimes against human 
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Uruguay, and South Africa have each granted amnesty to members of former regimes who 
commanded death squads that tortured and killed thousands of civilians within their 
respective countries.248 Meanwhile Panama, under international pressure, agreed to grant 
asylum to the Haitian military leaders, notwithstanding the United Nations Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum, which provides that "states shall not grant asylum to any person with 
respectto whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a ... crime 
against humanity."249 
To this list must be added the modern practice of the United Nations, which in the last 
three years has worked to block mention of prosecuting former Khmer Rouge leaders for 
their atrocities from inclusion in the Cambodia peace accords, pushed the Mandela 
government to accept an unconditional amnesty for crimes committed by the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, and, as detailed above, helped negotiate, and later endorsed, a broad 
amnesty for the Haitian military regime.250 As one commentator recently remarked, 
'' [ w ]hereas the human rights organs of the United Nations have developed clearer and more 
elaborate guidelines on the required treatment of past human rights violations, the 
peacekeeping branches of the United Nations [the Secretary-General and Security Council] 
have subordinated those guidelines to an ill-advised effort to bring even mass murders into 
the political process, in the hopes they can be placated, reformed, or at least isolated.' ' 251 
A notable exception to this trend within the U.N. peacekeeping branches can be found 
in the actions of the Security Council-created Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal with respect 
to the adoption of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In its 1992 proposal for the 
Tribunal's Rules, the United States suggested that low level perpetrators accused of crimes 
against humanity be given immunity from prosecution in exchange for their testimony 
against higher level officials.252 In explaining the judges' decision not to permit granting 
immunity, the President of the Tribunal stated: ''The persons appearing before us will be 
charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and 
other inhumane acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune 
from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may 
otherwise be. " 253 
And yet even this development sends a mixed message. On the one hand it is 
significant that a subsidiary organ of the Security Council refused to allow immunity for 
crimes against humanity. On the other, by stating that "no one should be immune," the 
judges used words of aspiration rather than words acknowledging a legal obligation as is 
necessarj to evince opinio juris. In addition, the proposal for immunity that the judges 
rejected would have also covered breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide 
Conventions, which prohibit the granting of immunity and amnesty. Rather than suggesting 
that international law also prohibits the conferring of immunity upon persons who have 
committed crimes against humanity, the judges' decision may have merely reflected their 
before the International Court ofJustice to compel India to repatriate the Pakistani troops. Political considerations 
ultimately prevailed. In I 973, Bangladesh and India agreed not to prosecute the Pakistani prisoners in exchange 
for political recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan and the withdrawal of Pakistan's case against India before the 
International Court of Justice. Id. 
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recognition that it would have been unworkable to allow immunity for some crimes and 
preclude it for others within the Yugoslavia Tribunal's jurisdiction. Moreover, that the 
United States even proposed a rule permitting immunity to perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity is another indication of state practice contrary to the existence of a customary 
international law obligation to prosecute. 
Those who take the position that there is a customary international law duty to 
prosecute criines against humanity respond to the Iita.11y of contrary state practice by 
asserting that "even those states which have adopted amnesty laws and thereby allowed 
impunity do not deny the existence, in principle, of an obligation to prosecute, but invoke 
countervailing considerations, such as national reconciliation or the instability of the 
democratic process.' ' 254 Support for this line of reasoning can be found in the Internation-
al Court of Justice's Judgment in the Nicaragua case255 and in the frequently-cited opinion 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Filartiga case.256 
There are several problems with this argument in the context of the duty to prosecute 
crimes against humanity, however. First, it is factually ii!Correct. Although a few of the 
states that have granted amnesty to the leaders of the former regime have characterized their 
action as an exception to the rule/57 most never mention the existence of a rule at all. 
Indeed, the record concerning the Haitian amnesty is completely silent on the issue. A 
second problem stems from the fact that the nature of the obligation to prosecute such 
crimes is purportedly absolute.253 As a consequence, appeals to exceptions or justifications 
supposedly contained within the rule do not in fact confiiul the rule but rather deny its 
existence and in its place assert an aitemative rule that would allow amnesty for crimes 
against humanity whenever justified by needs for political reconciliation. A final problem 
is that the rationale of the International Court of Justice and the Second Circuit really makes 
sense only with respect to a situation where customary law has gradually been built up 
254. Edelenbos, supra note 39, at 21; Roht-Arriaza, supra note II, at 496-97. 
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under an obligation to observe il States often violate international law, just as individuals often 
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through State practice, and where subsequent instances of inconsistent conduct occur. 259 
The reasoning is much less convincing where, as in the case of a duty to prosecute crimes 
against humanity, the discrepancy between words and practice has been glaring from the 
very start. 260 . 
Thus, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy and jurisprudential arguments 
warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of 
an obligation under customary international law to refrain from conferring amnesty for such 
crimes. Customary international law concerning crimes against humanity, therefore, does 
not provide a solid basis for challenging the validity of the Amnesty Law. 
IV. CONCLUSION' 
This Article began with the question: did the Haitian amnesty achieve a proper mix 
between law and political reality? On the political side, we have seen that the decision to 
provide amnesty to members of the former military regime was largely imposed upon the 
Aristide government by the United States and United Nations, whose overriding concern was 
to restore the democratic government to power without having to introduce troops into a 
combat situation in Haiti. Haitian interests in discouraging future atrocities, deterring 
vigilante justice, and reinforcing respect for law and the new democratic government through 
prosecutions were never given serious attention. · 
What makes the Haitian situation so unique is that the United States and United 
Nations actually participated in the negotiation of the amnesty-for-peace deal with the 
Haitian military leaders, pressured the Aristide Government to accept the deal, and then 
endorsed the deal as the only acceptable way to resolve the Haitian situation. While the 
amnesty achieved the desired short-term benefit (i.e., the democratic government was 
restored with almost no bloodshed and the human rights abuses came to an end), the long-
term implications were perhaps not fully appreciated at the time. For, like a genie that has 
been let out of a bottle, this precedent cannot be undone. Nor will it be ignored. Instead, 
as Justice Goldstone and Graham Blewitt feared, the Haitian amnesty is likely to serve as 
a beacon of hope for those accused of some of history's most shocking atrocities in Bosnia, 
Iraq, and Cambodia. In other parts of the globe, future dictators will be encouraged by the 
Haitian amnesty to commit new atrocities with impunity. 
Before supporting or endorsing such amnesties and thereby condoning acts of 
international barbarism, the United Nations, as an organization committed to furthering 
human rights, and the United States, as the twentieth century's last remaining superpower, 
should more fully consider whether peace achieved in this manner is worth the long-term 
price. Perhaps a more appropriate response would parallel U.S. policy with respect to 
terrorism, which prohibits the government from ''making concessions of any kind to 
terrorists" on the ground that "such actions would only lead to more terrorism. " 261 If 
the United States and the United Nations cannot prevent atrocities from occurring, they 
should at least seek to punish the perpetrators. This policy was the rationale behind the 
recent establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda-a rationale that has been undermined by the participation of the United Nations 
and United States in the Haitian amnesty deal. 
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And what of international law? Professor Anthony D' Amato recently wrote that he 
knew of no "international lawyer who has objected" to the Haitian amnesty-for-peace 
deal.262 The reason public international law generalists have (until now) been silent is not 
that international law has nothing to say on the issue of amnesty for perpetrators of 
atrocities, but rather that it did not apply to the situation in Haiti. Had the atrocities in Haiti 
occurred during an international conflict, the Geneva Conventions would have required 
prosecution; had the violence been directed at ethnic, national, racial, or religious groups, 
the Genocide Convention would have required prosecution; and had Haiti been a party to 
the Torture Convention, it would have required prosecution. Any amnesty conferred would 
have constituted a v1olation of treaty laW and would be subject to challenge in a variety of 
domestic and international fora. Unfortunately, none of these conventions applied to the 
Haitian situation, and, therefore, they played n~ role in the decision to swap amnesty for 
peace. Nor would these conventions ap:ply to most of the other countries now wrestling with 
their repressive pasts that have concluded, or are considering, similar amnesty-for-peace 
deals. Like Haiti, few of these countries are party to the Torture Convention, abuses are 
most often targeted at political groups, and the situation rarely constitutes an international 
armed conflict. 
While the international criminal conventions are unlikely to apply to such situations, 
there is growing recognition of a duty for states to do something to give meaning to the 
human rights enumerated in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which are much more likely to be applicable. Yet, the 
"something" required is not necessarily prosecution of former ieaders responsible for 
violations of these general human rights treaties. Given the precedent discussed earlier, it 
is likely that both the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights would agree that the Aristide Government-which has established a tiuth 
commission, instituted purges of officers from the military, conducted limited prosecutions, 
and has put into place a program of victim compensation and civil redress-adequately 
discharged its duty to ensure human rights, notwithstanding its failure to prosecute the 
military leaders responsible for violations of those rights. 
On the other hand, the analysis ~ontained in this Article demonstrates that the Haitian 
atrocities almost certainly constituted crimes against humanity under customary international 
law. Customary international law recognizes permissive jurisdiction to prosecute leaders 
responsible for such crimes either nationally or before an international tribunal. From a 
legal standpoint, it would be perfectly appropriate, for example, to extend the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda Tribunal's jurisdiction to cover the crimes against humanity committed by the 
Haitian military leaders, although the politics of the Security Council suggest such a course 
of action is highly unlikely . 
. . In addition, there are a host of compelling policy and jurisprudential reasons in favor 
of an international duty to prosecute crimes against humanity, which would preclude the 
granting of amnesties for perpetrators. Yet, despite a large collection of General Assembly 
resolutions calling for prosecutions of crimes against humanity, and notwithstanding the 
wishful thinking of a number of international legal scholars, state practice plainly does not 
support. the existence of an obligation under international law to refrain from conferring 
amnesty for crimes against humanity. That the United Nations, itself, felt free of legal 
constraints in endorsing the Haitian amnesty deal underscores this conclusion. 
In this regard, our inquiry into the permissibility of the Haitian amnesty has placed us 
in the midst of one of the most enduring of international legal questions-namely, what is 
262. Anthony D'Amato, Correspondence, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 95 (1995). 
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the nature of customary international law? There are those, especially in the field of human 
rights, who would focus entirely on the words, texts, votes, and excuses themselves and 
disregard inconsistent practice as either unimportant or as the exception that proves the rule. 
The trouble with such an approach that focuses so heavily on words is ''that it is grown like 
a flower in a hot-house and that it is anything but sure that such creatures will survive in 
the much rougher climate of actual state practice. " 263 A "rule" that is so divorced from 
the realities of state practice is unlikely to achieve substantial compliance in the real world 
and, therefore, cannot be said to be a binding rule at all, but rather an aspiration. 
On the other side of the debate are those, including the author of this Article, who 
acknowledge that such proclamations may constitute a starting point in the formation of 
customary international law, but look beyond the rhetoric emanating from the halls of the 
United Nations for evidence of actual state practice.264 If there exists widespread practice 
in conformity with these proclamations, then it can be said that a rule has ripened into 
binding customary internationallaw.265 In such cases, a few instances of departure from 
the rule will not disprove the existence of customary international law, but when the 
departures are the norm and comp_liance is the exception as is the case of prosecuting crimes 
against humanity of a prior regime, a customary international law duty cannot be deemed 
to exist. 
Yet, given the compelling justifications for an international duty to prosecute crimes 
against humanity, waiting for state practice to catch up with the views expressed in General 
Assembly resolutions does seem an unsatisfactory approach. As opposed to brokeri..ng 
amnesty-for-peace deals, the better approach would be for the U.N. Security Council to play 
a preemptive role by deciding in specific situations, such as Haiti, which constitute threats 
to international peace and security, that no amnesty for the perpetrators of atrocities shall 
be permitted or internationally respected.266 At the very least, the United Nations, having 
taken the lead in attempting to fashion an emerging rule of customary international law that 
would require prosecutions of crimes against humanity, should oppose amnesty in countries 
where it has become deeply involved. 
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